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A. THE NATIONAL RESPONSE SYSTEM IN CRISIS 
Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast almost four years after the 
terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, and these are the seminal events in 
our homeland security history.  They are also the epicenter of America’s debate over our 
national ability to prepare and respond to catastrophic events.  While the two events bring 
to mind widely disparate images of suffering and heroism, each provides an opportunity 
to reflect on the performance of our national response system.  In many ways, America is 
left with more questions than answers.  Did our complex network of response agencies 
perform as designed, at the local, regional and national levels?  What critical elements of 
the effort succeeded and which failed?  Is local emergency management germane in all 
situations?  For those Incidents of National Significance (IoNS) as defined in the 
National Response Plan (NRP), what is an appropriate role for the military with respect 
to command and control of domestic incidents?  Katrina and 9/11 challenged the 
preconceived notions of the resiliency of our response efforts in New York, Louisiana, 
Mississippi and Alabama.  Evaluating how the response network formed in crisis and 
exposing the seams of this network, including the federal, state, and local agencies, 
private sector and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), provides insight into our 
future ability to manage operations in the wake of a catastrophe.  While the exhaustive 
review of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 
9/11 Commission Report provides a glimpse of nearly every facet of the attacks the 
attacks of 2001, many of the lessons of Hurricane Katrina continue to be published at the 
time of this writing.  
Yet, even in the immediate aftermath of an enormous disaster the size of 
Hurricane Katrina, much of the review can focus on a few significant enablers of the 
response common to all disasters, whether man-made or natural, intentional or accidental.  
The NRP creates a “national framework in terms of both product and process”1 for 
domestic incident management and reinforces the authority and jurisdiction of individual                                                  
1 The Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Final) Full Version (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, December 2004), i, 
http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dhs/nps08-010605-06.pdf [Accessed January 15, 2006]. 
2 
agencies to support the effective emergency management operations.  Success in 
emergency response operations, however, does not rest solely with agreements on 
command and control, jurisdiction, and authority.  It is the process of knitting together 
myriad agencies and sectors to achieve unity of effort that determines success.  Absent 
this effective collaboration of interagency efforts, the NRP becomes a paper tiger which 
documents the collective yet uncoordinated response of our entire nation. 
B. CRITICAL ENABLERS OF OUR SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE 
Ultimately, the success of emergency response operations hinges on two process-
related elements that receive little attention in the NRP or other strategic policy 
documents.  This paper examines the nexus and interdependency of these variables: the 
formation of the response network in the aftermath of an Incident of National 
Significance (IoNS) and the management of knowledge throughout that network.  Both 
elements are critical enablers of local command and control of emergency management 
functions that fuel the decision-making process of all levels of government and both 
directly impact the proper balance of federal, state and local power and resources. 
C. RESPONSE NETWORK ISSUES 
While broadly encompassing virtually every conceivable detail of emergency 
planning and response, the central element of the NRP is the coordinating mechanism by 
which the federal government provides resources to state and local agencies.  This 
hierarchy is designed to bridge all agency boundaries and sectors of the economy and 
designate the appropriate level of federal resources based on local needs.  Yet this 
government-centric hierarchy represents just a portion of the complex small-world 
network which emerges in the affected community.  Especially in crisis, organizations 
must be agile, immediately aware of the evolving situation, and flexibly meet the 
demands of the community. While autonomous decision-making and network centric 
operations are conducive in this environment, bureaucracies often rely on a prescriptive 
chain-of-command that fails to keep pace with the dynamic and evolving situation.  
Theoretically, the network of first responders, the community, the private sector and 
NGOs all influence emergency response activities—many directly impact the decision-
making process of the Incident Commander.  Imagine the NRP as an inverted pyramid of 
resources—ultimately, all resources come to rest on the local jurisdiction and under the 
3 
leadership of the Incident Commander who must instantly integrate the vast network of 
resources.  How this network forms, in an environment in which virtually all local 
command and control infrastructure is non-existent, will provide a key insight in 
developing future emergency response plans.  
D. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Critical information flows through the response network to provide the Incident 
Commander with the situational awareness to allocate resources for emerging problems, 
determine the appropriate mix of assets, and request additional support to fill identified 
gaps.  When one or more agencies are involved or the disaster involves multiple agency 
and political jurisdictions, the Incident Commander may be replaced by a Unified 
Command, as defined in the NIMS.2  With respect to this document, most of the 
references to the senior decision-making entity at the tactical level of disaster/emergency 
management will be referred to as the Unified Command.  Managing this precious 
information as it is transformed into knowledge affects the speed and effectiveness of all 
response efforts.  Interestingly enough, this subject also receives little discussion in 
policy, yet is mentioned only as an “important” feature of the NRP.  One could argue that 
organizations are generally assumed to be interoperable by merely assimilating into the 
construct of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). In theory, information 
readily flows across agency and sector seams and it adequately supports the NIMS 
decision-making process.  Unfortunately, little attention is paid to the process of 
collaboration that must occur within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and 
throughout the entire response network.  It is this collaborative effort that determines how 
to acquire, retain, and analyze information so that it can be transformed into timely and 
relevant knowledge. 
Aligning with the national planning guidance, EOCs at all levels of American 
government are organized according to the NIMS model and utilize specific channels to 
manage and filter information to the Incident Commander.  These channels, called 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), relate to a specific topic, i.e., Emergency 
Management, Urban Search & Rescue, Firefighting, Mass Care, etc.  Little guidance, 
                                                 
2 The Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Dept. of Homeland Security, March 1, 2004), 
http://knxup2.ad.nps.navy.mil/homesec/docs/dhs/nps14-030604-02.pdf [Accessed January 12, 2006]. 
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however, is provided regarding the cross-ESF application of this information and the 
collaborative procedures necessary within the multi-agency environment. The effective 
management of this knowledge directly influences the quality of the decision-making 
process—good decisions are made with timely, accurate and complete information; poor 
decisions are typically linked to a lack of knowledge regarding the elements of the 
disaster. 
E. KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Several research questions are to be addressed in the following chapters: 
• How does emergency response policy, at the federal and state levels, address 
the formation of the social network of first responders that forms in the 
aftermath of an Incident of National Significance (IoNS)? 
• What are the characteristics of the ad hoc network that forms and how does 
the response topology enable organizational interoperability? 
• How does the significant devastation of all communication systems affect the 
formation of the response network? 
• To what degree is the decision making process of the Incident Commander or 
Unified Command impacted by this network and knowledge environment? 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This paper is organized into the following sections: 
• Chapter I is an overview of the issues affecting response operations and 
identification of the key research questions; 
• Chapter II is a literature review of Network Theory and Knowledge 
Management; 
• Chapter III is a short explanation of the research methods used to complete 
this project; 
• Chapter IV is an overview of federal, state and local policies and statutes that 
impact on network operations and knowledge management in the incident 
management field; 
• Chapter V is a comparative case study of the response operations conducted in 
Hancock County, Mississippi, following the landfall of Hurricane Katrina on 
August 29, 2005. 
• Chapter VI provides the policy implications of networks and knowledge and 
how these theories applied to the environment of the response operations in 
Hancock County.  Issues are analyzed from the doctrinal, organizational and 
technological aspects of the response network.  Recommendations are offered 
as potential paths for future study or as solutions to existing gaps revealed in 
the analysis. 
5 
• Chapter VII is the conclusion of the thesis. 
G. MOVING FORWARD 
As America continues to refine and develop our incident management system, 
leveraging the strength of networks to achieve knowledge interoperability—moving 
beyond the NIMS and its primary focus of organizational interoperability—will be a 
critical step in our homeland security progress.  A thorough examination of the policy 
context and its application in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina may provide the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW: NETWORK THEORY AND 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
A. NETWORK THEORY 
Within the past decade, the study of social networks has taken on new prominence 
in the field of complexity theory.  Large, complex systems define most of the components 
of our world, from the World Wide Web to the U.S. power grid system to our 
telecommunications system.  Social networks form as people and organizations connect 
with other people and organizations in a variety of conditions.  Much of the way in which 
these networks form and how they function have been examined and explained by social 
scientists and mathematicians.   
1. Networks and Small Worlds 
Modern network theory traces its roots to Leonard Euler who, in 1783, developed 
a mathematical proof regarding the “Bridges of Konigsberg,” Russia.  This proof was 
groundbreaking because it explained the relationship of the bridges in terms of a graph 
and as a series of nodes and links.3  Euler thus created modern graph theory and his proof 
was marginally developed and improved over the next two centuries by a variety of 
mathematicians.  Yet the underlying question of how these graphs, or networks are 
formed, remained undiscovered until the 1950s when random graph theory was 
discovered by Paul Erdos and Alfred Renyi.4  Erdos and Renyi theorized that random 
associations of nodes led to a graph in which all nodes possessed approximately the same 
number of links.5  Two key assumptions of this theory were that the number of nodes 
remained constant and that all nodes were characteristically equivalent, i.e. no hierarchy 
existed within the random network.  Random graph theory was further refined in 1967 by 
Stanley Milgram, who discovered that, within a network of any size, any two nodes are 
separated by approximately six links.6  Milgram found that a vast network will collapse 
                                                 
3 Alberto-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and what it 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Perseus Books Group, 2003), 11. 
4 Mark Buchanan, Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Science of Networks, ed. Angela von 
der Lippe (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002), 35. 
5 Ibid., 22. 
6 Ibid., 30. 
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upon itself and display a degree of separation between any two nodes that is significantly 
smaller than the total number of links in the network. 
Continuing to further refine the study of networks, Mark Granovetter published 
The Strength of Weak Ties in 1972, which introduced a revolutionary concept in the field.  
Granovetter concluded that society is composed of dense clusters of tightly connected 
nodes, some of which have “weak” links to other clusters.  These weak links actually 
serve as bridges between these small worlds and prevent any cluster from becoming 
isolated. 
 
Figure 1.   A) Random network, B) Random Network with Weak Ties7 
 
These weak links between assume a heightened level of significance because they 
tie the network of small worlds together.8  This concept differs from the random network, 
in that any node within the random network has an equal likelihood of being connected to 
any other node.  Granovetter proved that small clusters are more likely to be highly 
interconnected and possess a few links that tie them into the rest of the network.  In 1998, 
Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz theorized that while maintaining the same degree of 
clustering within a network, the weak ties that span to other small worlds significantly 
shrink the diameter of the entire network.9  Even though these models moved the 
understanding of networks significantly forward, critical features exhibited among small 
worlds still remained unexplained.  
That was until the discovery of network hubs, which are nodes that develop an 
unusually large number of links.  This concept originates with the ideas of economist 
Vilfredo Pareto, who provided the foundation for the development of the 80/20 rule in the 
                                                 
7 Buchanan, Nexus, 44. 
8 Ibid., 44. 
9 Barabasi, Linked, 53. 
9 
early 1900s.10  Applied to network theory, this rule holds that roughly eighty percent of 
the links within a network are possessed by only about twenty percent of the nodes.  
Building on this concept, Barabasi proposed that many networks are scale-free, in that no 
one node possesses the same number of links as all other nodes.  He found that the 
distribution of links within the network followed the Power Law, meaning that just a few 
hubs possessed most of the links in the network and that even if the number of nodes 
increases significantly, the number of links between any two nodes increases 
negligibly.11  The Power Law distribution guides the transformation of the random 
network into one which is “scale-free”—and the networks invisibly transform from a 
state of chaos to a more orderly condition. 
One of the primary differences between random networks and most real networks 
is the concept of network growth.  Real networks continuously grow and expand the 
number of nodes, whereas random networks are constant.  Barabasi found that real 
networks are governed by two laws: growth and preferential attachment.12  Growth is 
straightforward, but preferential attachment means that any node entering the network 
will attach itself to a node with more links.  This rich-get-richer phenomenon pervades 
scale-free networks throughout the world.  Barabasi also introduced the concept of a 
fitness connectivity product, which is a qualitative measure of a node’s attractiveness in 
establishing new links among the network.13  This attractiveness among nodes drives 
competition within the network for new links as networks expand.  The underlying truth 
of scale-free network theory is summed up best by Barabasi, “no matter how large and 
complex a network becomes, as long as preferential attachment and growth are present, it 
will maintain its hub dominated scale-free topology.”14  
                                                 
10 Barabasi, Linked, 66. 
11 Buchanan, Nexus, 86. 
12 Barabasi, Linked, 86. 
13 Ibid., 96. 
14 Ibid., 91. 
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Figure 2.   A Random and Scale-Free Network15 
 
2. Network Strengths and Vulnerabilities 
Scale-free networks robustly absorb failure at the nodal level, yet are highly 
vulnerable to failure at the hub.  For most scale-free networks, many nodes can be 
removed from the network with little impact on the viability of the entire system.  The 
networks, because of their scale-free nature, survive these failures.  Attacking the hubs, 
however, yields a different result.  Within any scale-free network, if even a few hubs are 
disabled, system failure results and the network will devolve into isolated components.  
This “cascading failure” is the most serious vulnerability of the scale-free network and 
provides an opportunity to focus resources on the hubs as a preventive strategy. 
3. Network-Centric Operations 
The study of Network-Centric Operations (NCO) emerged over the past decade as 
military organizations engaged a battle against the asymmetric threat of terrorism.  In 
1996, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt coined the use of the term “Netwar” in study of 
this form of conflict that is less than war.16  Netwar protagonists use the strength and 
speed of networks to communicate and conduct decentralized operations.  The 
performance of the network is based on dense, “all-channel” communications among all 
nodes.17  In the tension between network and hierarchical organizations, netwar 
characteristics tend to erode the power of hierarchies.18  Two central counter-netwar 
concepts emanate from the Arquilla and Ronfeldt findings: 1) a network approach is 
                                                 
15 Barabasi, Linked, 91 
16 John Arquilla and others, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 5, 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR789/ [Accessed January 12, 2006]. 
17 Ibid., 10. 
18 Ibid., 81. 
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needed to defeat a network, and 2) the first organization to master the networked form of 
operations will have a distinct advantage.19 
Within military organizations, the concept of Centralized Command – 
Decentralized Execution (CCDE) is gaining popularity as organizations focus on the flow 
of information throughout the network and how that information affects the decision 
making process.  CCDE blurs the distinction between organization levels and renders 
invalid many previous agreements on authority, jurisdiction, and command-and-control.20  
In the words of VADM Mustin in National Defense Publication (NDP-6), “You must be 
prepared to take action…when certain conditions are met; you cannot anticipate minute-
by-minute guidance.”21   
The way in which networks organize is particularly germane to this thesis.  “The 
network is the enterprise. While the firm continues to be the unit of accumulation of 
capital…and strategic management, business process is performed by ad hoc 
networks.”22 Several network forms, from the perspective of the organization, are 
relevant to the way in which information impacts the decision making process.  Three 
forms take shape; 1) extra-networks which are designed and governed by the 
organization, 2) inter-network, designed and governed by the organization but open for 
outside participation, and 3) an open network used by anyone willing to participate in 
knowledge creation.23  The cultural environment of the network will have a significant 
impact on the development of a knowledge management system.  Cross-cultural 
situations are particularly difficult because of the different language systems among  
 
                                                 
19 John Arquilla and others, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 82, 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR789/. 
20 Richard M. Gomez, "Centralized Command - Decentralized Execution: Implications of Operating in 
a Network Centric Warfare Environment" (Master’s Thesis, Air War College), 6, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A424605&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf [Accessed April 25, 2005]. 
21 Ibid., 18. 
22 Sven A. Carlsson, "Knowledge Managing and Knowledge Management Systems in Inter-
Organizational Networks," Knowledge and Process Management 10, no. 3 (July-September 2003): 198. 
23 Ibid. 
12 
participating groups.24  If network centric organizations are to succeed and sustain a 
competitive advantage, managing knowledge within the network becomes the paramount 
concern.25 
B. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (KM) 
1. Why is Information Important to Organizations? 
In today’s Information Age, knowledge is the crucial asset for organizations, 
whether they are from the public or private sectors.26  KM study has focused on the role 
of knowledge in the business world as corporations improve service and reduce costs.  
The global marketplace is so intensely competitive across all sectors that the acquisition 
and management of knowledge is a transcendental capability that provides benefits not 
achievable through other technological advances.27 Advances in product capabilities, 
service delivery techniques, or manufacturing technology are temporary in nature, while 
an organization’s ability to master its own internal knowledge is one of the few 
sustainable advantages.28  
To realize the central role knowledge plays in all modern organizations, consider 
the information-centric nature of government and private sector activities, in which the 
only tangible resource that flows through an organization is knowledge.  Competitive 
advantage is derived from unique knowledge and how the organization manages internal 
and external knowledge.29  In the words of Peter Drucker, “knowledge has become the 
key economic resource and the dominant—and perhaps even the only—source of 
comparative advantage.”30  Despite its critical importance and the commonly accepted 
                                                 
24 Nigel J. Holden and Harald F. O. Von Kortzfleisch, "Why Cross-Cultural Knowledge Transfer is a 
Form of Translation in More Ways than You Think," Knowledge and Process Management 11, no. 2 
(April-June 2004): 128. 
25 Carlsson, "Knowledge Managing and Knowledge Management Systems," 194. 
26 Claudio Garavelli, Michele Gorgoglione and Barbara Scozzi, "Knowledge Management Strategy 
and Organization: A Perspective of Analysis," Knowledge and Process Management 11, no. 4 (October-
December 2004): 273. 
27 Mark E. Nissen and James Espino, “Knowledge Process and System Design for the Coast Guard,” 
Knowledge and Process Management 7, no. 3 (July-September 2000): 165. 
28 Carlsson, "Knowledge Managing and Knowledge Management Systems," 194. 
29 Ibid., 195. 
30 Nissen and Espino, “Knowledge Process and System Design,” 165. 
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view that knowledge is the most sustainable future advantage, few organizations are truly 
capable of leveraging and managing knowledge.31  
The mastery of knowledge yields tangible and intangible results that are 
comprehensive and self-sustaining.  These benefits include: 1) improved performance, 2) 
higher productivity and greater efficiency, 3) elevating people as a valuable resource of 
the organization, and 4) applying knowledge as an advantage over competitors.32  
Although the previous discussion revolved around the business argument for improved 
knowledge management, a direct application to the military environment has also been 
developed.  In the military context, operational knowledge directly leads to improved 
battlefield awareness and information superiority so desired by commanders in all forms 
of warfare.  “There is no fusing of information that meets the needs of all warriors. 
However, with concise, accurate, timely and relevant information, unity of effort is 
improved and uncertainty is reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit 
opportunities and fight smarter.”33 
So why is information superiority so critical, and why now?  Simply put, it is the 
only long-term advantage that an organization can achieve in the dynamic global 
environment.  Whether the organization is a multi-national corporation or a local 
emergency agency, knowledge is the key to sustained future success.  Within the field of 
KM, many efforts are focused on the intersection of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) and Knowledge Management Systems (KMS) to acquire information 
superiority in all aspects of operations.34  
2. Data, Information, Knowledge or Wisdom? 
Before organizations successfully implement efforts to acquire, analyze and 
leverage internal knowledge, defining the context of organizational information is crucial.  
From this perspective, information and knowledge are often treated as synonyms, yet this 
                                                 
31 Kuan Yew Wong and Elaine Aspinwall, "Knowledge Management Implementation Frameworks: A 
Review," Knowledge and Process Management 11, no. 2 (April-June 2004): 93. 
32 Xiaoming Cong and Kaushik V. Pandya, "Issues of Knowledge Management in the Public Sector," 
Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management 1, no. 2 (2003): 27, www.ejkm.com [Accessed April 24, 
2005]. 
33 Richard M. Gomez, "Centralized Command - Decentralized Execution," 1. 
34 Carlsson, "Knowledge Managing and Knowledge Management Systems," 195. 
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confusion of terms is often misleading and can create significant challenges when 
developing an enterprise-wide knowledge management system.35  
Separating information from knowledge has always been problematic—even the 
ancient Greeks struggled with framing the notion that knowledge resides in the individual 
and the role of the individual is to contextualize knowledge.  Information, on the other 
hand, is something external to the human existence.36  Confusion over this terminology 
leads to the perspective that “one man’s knowledge is another man’s data.”37  As KM has 
matured, however, more precise definitions have been forthcoming.  Data is considered 
raw fact, while information is data put into meaning.  Knowledge is derived from 
information by making comparisons, identifying consequences and making connections.  
Furthermore, knowledge may be viewed as a resource in that it can be transferred, 
recombined, licensed, codified, and entered into a computer to create value to an 
organization.38  Wisdom becomes the use of accumulated knowledge.39  Additional 
attempts to clarify knowledge have focused on its active context and demonstrating how 
it is created, shared, integrated and used.40  This perspective is more focused on the 
process of developing knowledge than on content.41  It is within this process that 
knowledge emerges as a flow of interacting changes taking place in the minds of people 
who are involved in the learning process and is observable by its effects on behavior, 
thought processes, values, and beliefs.42  
So how does this process of transformation occur?  Knowledge is generally 
classified as either explicit (capable of being captured and written down in databases and 
                                                 
35 Vlatka Hlupic, Athanasia Pouloudi and George Rzevski, "Towards an Integrated Approach to 
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(April-June 2002): 90. 
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Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management 1, no. 1 (2003): 33, www.ejkm.com [Accessed April 24, 
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37 Ibid. 
38 Carlsson, "Knowledge Managing and Knowledge Management Systems," 195. 
39 Cong and Pandya, "Issues of Knowledge Management in the Public Sector," 26. 
40 Kane, "Reframing the Knowledge Debate," 34. 
41 Carlsson, "Knowledge Managing and Knowledge Management Systems," 195. 
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can be easily communicated and transferred) or tacit (which resides in the mind and is 
more difficult to communicate and transfer).43  The definition of these two types of 
knowledge varies in every situation, making the management of both more difficult.44  
Despite the challenge of accurately defining knowledge as either tacit or explicit, it is 
widely agreed that a tremendous amount of knowledge is embedded in internal processes, 
practices and internal documents and routines throughout all organizations.45  
In general, the management of knowledge includes the development of 
information that supports the knowledge process and transfer of that knowledge 
throughout the enterprise network.  Knowledge generation occurs through either the 
process of discovery (e.g., data mining, brainstorming, pattern analysis, or insight) or 
derivation (e.g., the use of process knowledge and employee experience to improve the 
organization’s internal process).46  
Perhaps one of the greatest challenges to KM is the effective transfer, or 
translation, of knowledge.  This knowledge transfer is closely linked to translation, which 
is often considered the oldest practice of converting knowledge from one domain to the 
other.47  The transfer of information is not merely an issue of effective understanding, but 
also includes the wider conversion into the user’s existing domain and context.  This 
function is made all the more difficult because of variables that affect the transformation 
process.  These variables are often identified as social (cultural), external 
(communication), combination (analytical) and internal (comprehension) and each 
presents a challenge to the effective design, implementation and function of a KM 
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46 Clyde W. Holsapple and Kiku Jones, "Exploring Primary Activities of the Knowledge Chain," 
Knowledge and Process Management 11, no. 3 (July-September 2004): 163. 
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influenced by ambiguity (the lack of clarity of the information), interference (cultural 
biases), and a lack of network equivalence (no similar definition exists in two separate 
networks).48  
Knowledge transfer can also be viewed from the perspective of its impact on 
organizational objectives and, when used in a cross-cultural (or cross-network) 
application, achieve unity of effort and harmonization between different components of 
the organization.  This transfer of knowledge creates and sustains value because: 1) it can 
be viewed as an activity that supports the improved performance of the network, 2) it is 
focused on a process and end-product quality, 3) levels of accuracy can be assigned, and 
4) constraints exist to ensure the production of good results.49  Additional considerations 
need to be made for the accuracy and volume of the knowledge being transferred between 
organizations and entities.  Knowledge transfer occurs along a continuum of varying 
degrees, from the general idea, to sufficient information, to the availability of most 
information, to the point at which virtually all information is conveyed.  Despite these 
considerations, many organizations continue to focus their efforts on the technological 
aspects of KM, yet many leadership and human-related factors remain critical to the 
overall success of the strategy.  As the active incorporation of ICT and KM provide great 
improvements over the continuous problems of stove-piped systems and the automation 
of manual processes, and other problems, much information may still be classified as 
“just a flow of messages,” not knowledge.50  
3. What is Knowledge Management? 
Although the precise definition of knowledge may be amorphous, KM is regarded 
as the “strategies and processes of identifying, capturing and leveraging knowledge.”51  
Others depict KM as the process to ensure the right knowledge is available in the right 
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form, to the right processor, at the right time, for the right cost.52  The essence of 
managing knowledge is deciding with whom to share information, what should be shared, 
how it should be shared, and actually sharing and using it.53  As organizations raise up 
information as the critical currency of the future, all resources and capabilities will be 
redefined in terms of how they impact or improve the enterprise-wide knowledge system. 
The ontology of KM consists of the primary activities of knowledge acquisition 
(from external sources), knowledge selection (from internal sources), knowledge 
generation (producing knowledge by discovery or derivation from existing knowledge), 
knowledge assimilation (altering the state of an organization’s knowledge resources), and 
knowledge emission (embedding knowledge into organizational outputs).54  Other 
perspectives identify four general processes in KM, including knowledge creation, 
knowledge organization, storage and retrieval, knowledge transfer and knowledge 
application.55 
KM combines theory and practice, but is also multi-disciplinary and incorporates 
human, organizational and technical factors to create a holistic approach to sustain 
organizational competitiveness.56  The variables that most affect KM strategy are related 
to organization culture, managerial style, the atmosphere, and the criteria adopted for 
division of labor (i.e., employee span of control, process specialization, etc.). Garavelli 
proposed a robust framework to assess KM initiatives, which included: relevance and 
applicability of proficiency (the ability to carry out tasks by using specific knowledge); 
commitment (of leadership, which is a critical issue in determining organizational design 
and management), behavior (cooperation and/or competition among the network), 
atmosphere (the political or ideological environment of the network), style of direction 
(the role of senior management in the knowledge process), prevalent type of knowledge 
(tacit or explicit), and the knowledge source (describes the main origin of knowledge).57  
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57 Garavelli, Gorgoglione and Scozzi, "Knowledge Management Strategy and Organization," 277. 
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Currently, most KM systems are limited to handling data rather than knowledge, 
since they are usually designed to deal with structured data, in which information is 
directly entered into fields or can be categorized and easily transferred throughout a 
network.58  In general terms, the major activities of the KM cycle include organizational 
and technical issues and can be categorized through the identification of data, generation 
of information, codification of information and transfer knowledge.  Identification and 
generation activities are focused on the acquisition of knowledge through either internal 
or external sources.59  Information is generated through discovery (e.g., data mining, 
brainstorming, analysis of activity patterns, or seizing upon a revelation) or derivation 
(using the tacit knowledge of the organizational process to improve outcomes).60  The 
acquisition of this knowledge can be direct or indirect.  Direct acquisition may take place 
by: obtaining or licensing data or patents, using a competitor’s intelligence, exploiting 
windows of opportunity for technological advance, obtaining trade secrets, collection of 
information from external sources, reviewing professional literature, leveraging 
technological advances, receiving external training, or participating in a collaborative 
acquisition.  This is a wide scale acquisition of knowledge that affects the entire 
organization.  The indirect acquisition method involves the assimilation of tacit 
knowledge through the entire workforce.61  Following knowledge acquisition, selection 
leverages internal sources, organizes knowledge and transfers knowledge for immediate 
or subsequent use, action (applied as soon as it is received) or storage (used from a 
database).62  Building upon this foundation, knowledge assimilation is the class of 
activities that alter the state of an organization’s knowledge resources by internally 
distributing and storing acquired, selected or generated knowledge.  These activities can 
be classified as either publishing (an emphasis on archiving and unidirectional flow of  
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knowledge) or interacting (multi-directional flow of knowledge).  Assimilation activities 
can be classified as formal (well defined, institutionalized) or informal (a more ad hoc 
approach).63  
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) enable the easy connection of 
individuals and permit knowledge to be captured, stored, accesses and converted in 
form.64  Good quality communications transfer knowledge with high values of: 1) 
availability (timeliness of the exchange of information), 2) suitability (means of 
presentation), and 3) accuracy (level of detail transmitted).65  Two main uses of ICT and 
KMS are identified as generally supporting the learning organization or the supporting of 
a specific knowledge process which leads to a comparative advantage.66  
4. Knowledge as a Catalyst for Organizational Change 
Perhaps one of the most transformational issues relevant to the field of KM is that 
information is now being viewed as a driver of organizational change.  The effective 
management of knowledge involves more than simply exploiting the data held on 
information systems.  It requires attention to the “softer” parts of the organization, such 
as how organizational structures and processes combine intellectual and human capital 
for learning, innovation and problem solving.  Through these processes, better service 
can be provided by improving the impact of knowledge management.  At present, most 
information systems simply support organizational structures to collect and disseminate 
information.67   
Most KM strategies support the traditional organizational model which is focused 
on stable responsibilities and static organizational charts.  The existing hierarchy 
designates formal relationships, groups individuals into departments and organizations, 
and designs systems to ensure effective communication, coordination and integration 
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vertically between organizational layers.68  As organizations become more integrated, the 
way that employees must collaborate changes dramatically.  The implementation of 
multi-disciplinary, cross-functional teams is critical for process-based organizations.  
These teams provide more responsibility, decision-making power and flexibility so that 
organizational performance increasingly relies on these teams.  Some KM practitioners 
have identified an urgent need that exists for companies to break from the traditional 
organization model and adopt key processes that are by definition cross-functional and 
deemphasize the functional structure of an organization.69  Processes cannot become the 
only basis for organizational structure, however.  Most organizations have to adopt a 
multi-dimensional matrix structure in which process responsibility is a key dimension.  
With this new structure, the role of middle and top managers has to be redesigned to 
develop and sustain coordination mechanisms.70   
In summary, KM gives organizations the ability to: 1) identify, consider and 
respond to strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, 2) act, assimilate feedback 
and react in these areas simultaneously, 3) develop the capacity to operate in real-time 
environments, 4) understand and create real value as determined by users of 
knowledge.71 
C. NETWORK AND KNOWLEDGE INTERDEPENDENCY 
When viewed in the abstract, it may appear that network theory and knowledge 
management are two independent fields of study, yet in the environment of a catastrophic 
disaster, both influence and shape the adequacy of the response effort.  Additional 
examination will reveal that these two critical concepts are actually interdependent, as 
communications strengthens network cohesion and the network requires the management 
of knowledge to conduct effective and efficient operations. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODS 
A. RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This thesis project focused on the development of changes to the response 
community and National Response Plan.  This agenda for change is based on a review of 
the social network analysis and knowledge management and the application of those 
fields on various policies that enact emergency management authorities and 
responsibilities. 
B. POLICY REVIEW 
Applying the observations of network analysis and knowledge management, a 
thorough review of response policy was conducted. This review included an assessment 
of the relevance of these two fields on the National Homeland Security Strategy, the 
National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, the National 
Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, the State of 
Mississippi Emergency Management Law, the Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan (also known as the Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan), the 
Mississippi Statewide Mutual Aid Compact and other policy documents. Key issues 
drawn from these policy documents focused on the validity of local control of response 
actions for catastrophic incidents and the role of various government agencies in 
supporting network formation and knowledge management systems. 
C. HANCOCK COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI CASE STUDY 
A case study of the emergency response in Hancock County was completed.  
Although it is the smallest of the three counties in Mississippi affected by Hurricane 
Katrina, Hancock County serves as an important example for other communities 
throughout America.  Even considering the relatively small population, the response 
environment was extremely complex due to three factors: the significant devastation to 
all existing infrastructure throughout the County, the loss of the local command and 
control capability over response agencies, and the overwhelming flow of response 
agencies into the local area.  The source of much information from the Hancock County 
case study comes from several Incident Action Plans generated by FEMA and the 
Hancock County Emergency Management Agency.  Other information was gleaned from 
22 
reports provided by members of the incident command staff and NGOs that worked in 
Hancock County after Katrina’s landfall.  Additionally, the author deployed to Hancock 
County as the Task Force Director of U.S. Coast Guard forces in Mississippi, and a 
significant amount of information in the case study comes from close personal 
observation of the response activities during this time period. 
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IV. RESPONSE POLICY 
A. ORIGINS OF LOCAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
In American history, emergency management functions have traditionally been 
the purview of state and local governments.  The Tenth Amendment of the Bill of Rights 
specifies that, “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”72  
This statement forms the basis for the balance of power between federal, state and local 
authorities.  The ideal of local emergency management is supported in the NIMS and the 
NRP.  The NRP goes so far as to state that “a basic premise…is that incidents are 
generally handled at the lowest organizational level possible.”73  Additionally, the NRP 
describes that “state, county and local EOCs represent the physical location at which the 
coordination of information and resources to support incident management activities 
normally takes place.”74  The concept that domestic incidents are managed by community 
leaders is pervasive throughout policy documents at all levels of government. 
B. A HIERARCHICAL APPROACH TO INCIDENT MANAGEMENT 
The federal role in domestic incident management evolved as significant 
catastrophes in the United States created strategic changes to the incident management 
process.  In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) assumed the lead role coordinating all federal resources in 
situations where state and local agencies were overwhelmed.  As an outcome of 
Hurricane Andrew, FEMA developed the Federal Response Plan (FRP), which linked all 
federal disaster response activities under a broad plan.  While the FRP focused heavily on 
federal government response actions, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 exposed weaknesses in 
our national approach and several policies were implemented to improve America’s 
preparedness and resilience. 
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1. The National Homeland Security Strategy 
In the first-ever national strategy specifically focused on domestic security, 
President Bush defined “homeland security” as “a concerted national effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks…and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”75  
Several critical mission areas are identified in the strategy which further clarifies the 
national strategy, including those for emergency services and information sharing and 
systems.76  Within the Emergency Preparedness and Response mission area significant 
changes were outlined, including the promulgation of a single all-hazards incident 
management plan, the creation of a national incident management system, and the 
enabling of seamless communication among all responders.77  The national vision for 
information sharing stresses the horizontal and vertical sharing of information, the 
common awareness of all resources and threats, and the incorporation of all source data.78 
a. The National Incident Management Strategy 
Building upon the Homeland Security Strategy, President Bush signed the 
“Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents,” also known as Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive Five (HSPD 5), and established a clear direction for the federal, 
state and local agencies to respond and support emergency management.  Within HSPD 
5, the President stressed that to “prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies…the United States Government 
shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management.”79   
Additional elements of the policy emphasize: 
• the organizational interoperability of all government agencies, at the federal, 
state and local levels, to work “efficiently and effectively” together; 
• a reemphasis that all incidents should be managed at the local level, calling 
upon the federal government to “assist when their [local] resources are 
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overwhelmed” and that “initial responsibilities for managing domestic 
incidents generally falls on the State and local authorities;” 
• Promote partnerships with the private sector and NGOs to “ensure adequate 
planning, equipment, training and exercise activities…to address incident 
management capabilities;” 
• “information related to domestic incidents is gathered and provided to the 
public, the private sector, State and local authorities, Federal departments and 
agencies.” 
b. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
With the introduction of NIMS in 2003, the Bush Administration enacted 
the comprehensive national model of disaster management that spanned all jurisdictions 
and functional disciplines.  This NIMS policy created a framework for interoperability 
designed to support the decision-making process of the Incident Commander.80  The 
foundation of the NIMS is embodied within the core of the Incident Command System 
(ICS) organizational structure, which was first developed by the fire services in the 
western United States in the 1970s.  The NIMS organization identified in Figure 3 applies 
the fire service model by employing the common lexicon which enables the 
organizational integration of dissimilar agencies and disciplines.  Within this structure, 
the Incident Command function establishes strategic priorities for disaster response; 
Operations plans and executes activities that are designed to achieve the strategic goals of 
the organization; Planning maintains an accurate assessment of the disaster and the status 
of resources available; Logistics manages the assigned resources to sustain operations; 
and Finance/Administration ensures accountability for all assigned resources.  This 
complex, process-oriented approach to disaster management requires a limited span of 
control for any individual component and the strict adherence to the ICS terminology, 
making it possible for dissimilar agencies to work together easily. 
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Figure 3.   Incident Command System – Command and General Staff81 
 
While NIMS does achieve organizational interoperability and consistency 
with respect to structure and language (i.e., the differences between Sections, Groups, 
Divisions and Task Forces, for example), some comprehensive requirements receive little 
attention in the policy.  “Establishing and maintaining a common operating picture and 
ensuring accessibility and interoperability” is a specific goal of the communications and 
information management systems of the NIMS.82  This notional common operating 
picture would allow information to be shared across all jurisdictions and disciplines and 
facilitate a comprehensive decision-making process.  This system “enable(s) Federal, 
State, local, tribal and private-sector and nongovernmental entities to integrate their 
information needs into a common operating picture.”83  Unfortunately, this is the only 
mention of the common operating picture in the NIMS.  Strangely, the responsibility for 
the function of information management is not assigned to any specific unit within the 
command system, but the entities most closely linked to information management are the 
units from Communications and Situation.84 
Incident specific communications are managed by the Communications 
Unit which falls under the Planning Section of the ICS.  The Communications Unit 
operates the incident communications center, distributes and repairs communications 
equipment, and maintains several radio networks, including the command net, tactical 
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nets, support nets, ground-to-air nets, and air-to-air nets.85  The predominant focus of the 
Communications Unit is the establishment and maintenance of voice and Automated 
Data Processing (ADP) systems, yet the management of the content flowing through 
these systems receives little mention in policy. 
Information flow in the NIMS process is, however, a direct result of a 
complex planning process which culminates in the development of the Incident Action 
Plan (IAP), a detailed planning document designed to reflect the goals and strategies of 
the incident command.  The planning process merges current information regarding the 
situation, possible future events, and strategies to attain incident objectives and develop 
the IAP for the next operational period.  The NIMS policy stresses simplicity and 
emphasizes that during the initial stages of the response, a plan must be developed “that 
can be communicated through concise oral briefings.”86  Several appendices to the IAP 
often detail additional aspects of the response, including the organizational chart, 
assignment list, communications plan, and logistics plan.87  Despite being specifically 
mentioned as an imperative issue in Chapter V of the NIMS policy, the concept of 
information management is not addressed elsewhere in the policy, as either a functional 
goal or responsibility. 
c. The National Response Plan (NRP) 
While a full review of the National Response Plan will not be conducted 
within this document, several elements of the NRP are particularly enlightening to gain a 
working knowledge of the plan that is germane to the development of networks and 
knowledge management.  This comprehensive, “all hazards” plan provides coordinating 
guidance for all federal agencies in the event of a domestic incident, whether it be a result 
of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.  To be more precise, the NRP is “a concerted 
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.”88  
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Within the context of this thesis, however, an overview of the Base Plan, the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, the Private Sector Coordination Support Annex, and the Volunteer and 
Donations Management Support Annex is likely to be sufficient. 
The NRP does indeed establish the single, national approach to domestic 
incident management envisioned in HSPD5.  Within the framework of the NRP, the use 
of NIMS “can be partially or fully implemented in the context of a threat…or the 
response to a significant event.”89  At every level of the response organization, 
interagency roles and responsibilities are displayed in Table 1, whether they are local, 
state or federal.  
Emergency Support Function Primary Federal Agency 
ESF 1 Transportation Department of Transportation 
ESF 2 Communications Department of Homeland Security 
ESF 3 Public Works & Engineering Department of Defense; US Army Corp of Engineers 
ESF 4 Firefighting Department of Agriculture, US Forest Service 
ESF 5 Emergency Management Department of Homeland Security, FEMA 
ESF 6 Mass Care, Housing and Human 
Services 
Department of Homeland Security, FEMA 
ESF 7 Resource Support General Services Administration 
ESF 8 Public Health & Medical Services Health and Human Services 
ESF 9 Urban Search & Rescue Department of Homeland Security, FEMA 
ESF 10 Oil and Hazardous Material 
Response 
Environmental Protection Agency 
ESF 11 Agriculture and Natural 
Resources 
Department of Agriculture 
ESF 12 Energy Department of Energy 
ESF 13 Public Safety and Security Department of Homeland Security 
ESF 14 Long-term Community Recovery Several primary agencies 
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Emergency Support Function Primary Federal Agency 
and Mitigation 
ESF15 External Affairs Department of Homeland Security, FEMA 
Table 1. Designation of ESF Primary Agencies90 
 
Coordinating federal support for national incidents is the critical objective 
of the NRP, and Figure 4 (below) depicts the organizational framework designed to 
identify and coordinate the movement of federal resources to the disaster.  Within this 
organization, all federal efforts are coordinated through the Joint Field Office (JFO) and 
led by the Principal Federal Official (PFO).  As the leader of all federal disaster efforts, 
the PFO is responsible for the seamless integration of federal support to state and local 
agencies and to resolve interagency conflicts.  The JFO, composed of a large, 
multiagency staff, aggregates state and local disaster requirements and coordinates 
operations to enable the effective and efficient prevention, preparedness, response and 
recovery efforts.91  The JFO resembles the ICS structure of the NIMS, but it also includes 
an element named the Coordination Group, which consists of senior federal and state 
officials to advise the PFO, and a Coordination Staff. 
Within the Coordination Group, the Federal Coordinating Official (FCO) 
determines the type and level of federal resources that will assist in the disaster response.  
The FCO’s responsibilities include conducting an initial appraisal of the incident, 
coordinating the delivery of federal resources to state and local governments, and 
working in conjunction with the State Coordinating Official to allocate resources as 
appropriate.  Depending on the severity of the disaster, the PFO and FCO may elect to 
deploy additional resources. Among many of the resources available for deployment are: 
Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), Federal Incident Response Support Teams 
(FIRSTs), Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), Veterinarian Medical 
Assistance Teams (VMATs), Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams 
(DMORTs), National Medical Response Teams (NMRTs), Urban Search and Rescue 
(US&R) teams, and Type 1 and Type 2 Incident Management Teams (IMTs). 
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In addition to this broad federal government support to disaster response, 
Department of Defense resources may be requested if all civilian federal agency 
resources are overwhelmed.  Requests for DoD assistance flow from the FCO to the 
Defense Coordinating Official (DCO).  The only exception to this request flow is for 
those requirements involving the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the National Guard, or 
DoD support provided directly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
Figure 4.   The NIMS Framework from the National Response Plan92 
 
While many federal agencies control many resources available for disaster 
response, the Governor possesses exclusive authority that establishes limits to federal 
authority and support.  Chief among these powers is the ability to declare a state of 
emergency and the provision of special police powers to various agents of the state, such 
as the police auxiliary.  Powers among the states vary widely in this regard, yet all states 
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recognize the Governor as the principal state official who directs response activities.  It is 
within this capacity that the Governor oversees the execution of the statewide emergency 
disaster plan, communicates with the public, enters into mutual aid agreements with other 
states and requests federal assistance when state and local resources are insufficient.93 
The official with the most unclear role in the NRP is the Local Chief 
Executive Officer, defined as the mayor or city or county manager who is responsible for 
the public safety of the citizens within an affected community.  This executive is 
responsible for local resource coordination, may suspend local laws and ordinances, 
fulfills a key leadership role in the community, participates in mutual aid agreements and 
may request State or Federal assistance if local resources are overwhelmed.94  It is at this 
level of the response organization that most response services will be delivered—yet it 
receives the least discussion in the NRP when viewed in comparison to the PFO, FCO 
and Governor. 
Within the NRP, several special annexes describe situations and actions 
that transcend the function-specific ESF annexes contained in Table 1.  Within the 
Catastrophic Incident Annex, an Incident of National Significance (IoNS) is defined as 
“any natural or man-made incident…that results in extraordinary levels of mass 
casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure…and/or 
government functions.”95  The NRP envisions a proactive federal response in anticipation 
of, or in response to, an IoNS and assigns expanded roles and authorities for all federal 
agencies under these special conditions.  To fully develop the roles and responsibilities, 
several planning assumptions guide agency actions to develop strategies and manage 
catastrophic incidents.  Particularly relevant when considered in the context of Hurricane 
Katrina, some of these assumptions are: 
• Tens of thousands of displaced persons 
• Incident of National Significance 
• Presidential Disaster Declaration 
• Nature and scope of the disaster may include…natural or manmade hazards 
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• Multiple incidents occur simultaneously 
• Significant disruption of the area’s critical infrastructure 
• Response capabilities of the local authorities is overwhelmed and many first 
responders may be victims 
• Lack of situational awareness for 24 to 48 hours 
• Large scale evacuations may occur 
• Large numbers of people may be left homeless 
• Environmental impacts severely challenge governments and communities to 
achieve a timely recovery 
Within the Private Sector Coordination Support Annex, the Federal 
Government specifies several avenues in which private-to-public collaboration is 
conducted.  Included among these are the DHS Private Sector Office, the Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection/Infrastructure Coordination Division, the National 
Infrastructure Coordination Center, and the Infrastructure Liaison during IoNS.96  While 
much policy is devoted to the cooperation of the federal government with the private 
sector, the relationship between the local government and private sector is considerably 
less well-defined and is “determined in large measure by the nature, scope and magnitude 
of the incident.”97 
The treatment of NGOs is even vaguer within the context of the NRP.  
The donation of goods and services by NGOs is laid at the feet of the “state, local and 
tribal governments.”98  DHS, as per the NRP, plays a coordinating role to assist in 
establishing an organization to manage volunteers and donations, yet most of the 
responsibility in forming the collaborative network rests on the local incident command. 
d. The National Strategy for the Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets 
President Bush signed this strategy into effect in February 2003 and 
highlighted the concept that America’s critical infrastructure provides essential goods and 
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services, connectivity and interoperability, and public safety.99  Emergency Services is 
included among the thirteen critical infrastructure sectors—from a national perspective, 
the vast network of first responders continues to face the challenges of 9/11, including 
non-interoperable communications, inadequate information sharing, and a lack of 
redundant systems.100  The strategy focuses on developing resilience within the first 
responder community, i.e., the network of public service agencies including fire, 
Emergency Management Services and law enforcement.  President Bush adopted several 
initiatives to assist the first responder community and targeted government efforts on the 
adoption of interoperable communications, the development of redundant 
communications networks, the protection of the response infrastructure, and the 
enhancement of mutual aid agreements.101  Many of these initiatives, particularly as they 
relate to communications technology, have gained significant attention after the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 
recommended that Congress should “ensure communications connectivity between and 
among civilian authorities, local first responders and the National Guard.”102  In October 
2001, the Office of Management and Budget designated Project SAFECOM as the 
primary E-government initiative to address the challenge of interoperable 
communications.103 
SAFECOM.  This program was created in 2001 to “unify the federal 
government’s efforts to…establish reliable public safety communications and achieve 
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national wireless interoperability.”104  While SAFECOM was initially led by the 
Department of the Treasury, leadership of the project migrated to FEMA and is now 
managed under the responsibility of the DHS Office for Interoperability and 
Compatibility.  By design, SAFECOM is chartered to provide an interoperable 
communications solution for traditional public response agencies, yet the project’s 
narrow definition of “first responder” resulted in the omission of public health, utility and 
transportation requirements.105  State and local jurisdictions play a critical role in 
developing an interoperable communications system.  They are likely to be the first 
agency to arrive and the last to leave an incident and 90 percent of the public safety 
communications infrastructure in the United States is owned by state and local 
governments.106  This program, however, is primarily focused on the interoperability of 
federal agencies, not on a broader definition of first responders.  Despite the need to 
develop a federal, state and local system of interoperability, SAFECOM “does not appear 
to be planning a standardized network overlay that can encompass the many useful, but 
mostly not connected, networks that already play vital roles in public safety 
communications.”107 
C. MISSISSIPPI EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Consistent with the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, states maintain 
many rights under their specific authorities that are independent from the Federal 
government.  Among these rights is the authority to manage domestic incidents within 
each state.  Applying these rights in the context of Hurricane Katrina, the State of 
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Mississippi enacted three specific documents: the Emergency Management Law (Title 
33, Chapter 15, Mississippi Code of 1972), the Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan 
(MEOP), and the Statewide Mutual Assistance Compact (SMAC) (revised June 2000).  
1. Mississippi Emergency Management Law 
Within this law, Mississippi defined a “catastrophic disaster” as requiring 
“massive state and federal assistance, including immediate military involvement.”108  
The Governor of Mississippi, as in many states, possesses broad powers to direct state-
wide actions in the even of catastrophic disaster.  Among these are: 1) working with the 
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) to develop a comprehensive plan 
for the state and integrate local plans into the state-wide plan, 2) determining the 
requirements of the state for life saving supplies in the event of a disaster, 3) cooperating 
with the President and Armed Forces, and, 4) entering into reciprocal aid agreements 
with other states and the federal government.109  Under a declared state of war (as 
opposed to an emergency), the Governor can assume powers far beyond those typically 
granted.  These additional powers include assuming the direct operational control of all 
emergency management forces and the commandeering of any private property for “the 
protection of the public or at the request of the President, the Armed Forces or the 
Emergency Management Agency of the United States.”110  MEMA is responsible for 
developing a comprehensive emergency management plan which includes several 
specific responsibilities for evacuation, sheltering, response, recovery and the 
establishment of standards for local community plans.  None of these provisions 
articulate the responsibility to develop a plan to manage incident information.  Each 
county shall also “develop an emergency management plan and program…consistent 
with the State…plan.”111  These local organizations are also required to “establish as 
necessary, a primary and one or more secondary operating centers to provide continuity  
 
                                                 
108 The Emergency Management Law, Title 33, Chapter 15, Mississippi Code of 1972, (1972, 
Amended 2004): 1, http://www.msema.org/documents/EMLawRevised2004.doc [Accessed January 14, 
2006]. 
109 Emergency Management Law, Title 33, Chapter 15, Mississippi Code of 1972, 8. 
110  Ibid., 12. 
111  Ibid., 17. 
36 
of government, and direction and control of emergency operations.”112  No discussion of 
the private sector or NGOs is contained within the Mississippi Emergency Management 
Law. 
2. Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan 
The MEOP describes response and recovery operations in Mississippi that are 
related to emergencies and major disasters.  The MEOP is built on five primary 
assumptions: 1) that local governments possess certain resources to provide for their 
people, 2) MEMA will conduct an assessment of the severity of the emergency, 3) the 
Governor, if necessary, will declare a state of emergency, 4) the State EOC will be 
activated to support a coordinated State and Federal response, and 5) if State and local 
resources are exceeded, Federal assistance will be requested under the Robert T. Stafford 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.113  Within the MEOP, examples of response 
activities include, coordinating emergency operations, establishing priorities, mobilizing 
personnel and equipment, and conducting emergency operations, i.e., search and rescue, 
providing emergency medical services, etc.  The plan recognizes that the initial 
responsibility of response, including the direction, control and coordination of operations 
“rests with the Local government.”114  At the local level, the President of the Board of 
Supervisors is the primary executive that may: establish a local EOC and secondary 
control centers, request State assistance, and organize and staff an emergency 
organization for the purpose of coordinating and managing disaster response and 
recovery.115  More specific information is contained in the ESF annexes, including those 
on Information and Planning (ESF5) and the Hurricane Annex. 
The ESF5 function within the MEOP supports both the dissemination of disaster-
related information to the public and the development of Incident Action Plans to 
establish priorities, strategies and solutions for public service agencies.  Information is 
developed through contact with public agencies and disseminated within a structure 
system of flash reports, situation reports and IAPs.  The ESF5 function is specifically 
                                                 
112  Emergency Management Law, Title 33, Chapter 15, Mississippi Code of 1972, 18. 
113 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, "Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan" (Planning 
Document, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Jackson, MS, 1999), 4. 
114 Ibid., 7. 
115 Ibid., 22. 
37 
tasked with “providing Information Management Systems and Automated Data 
Processing to all functional ESFs.”116  Information management, as specified within the 
ESF5 annex, indicates that several agencies are to provide information on a variety of 
relevant information, yet no specifics are given as to the actual information requirements 
or the potential use of that information by other ESF functions within the organization. 
3. Mississippi Emergency Management Assistance 
Under the provisions of the Mississippi Emergency Management Law, many local 
communities, including Hancock County, are party to the Statewide Mutual Aid Compact 
(SMAC), which was revised in June 2000.  The process for requesting mutual aid begins 
with a request from a community threatened by an overwhelming disaster.117  As a 
participating agency, all communities “shall render assistance…to the extent possible.”118  
Within the SMAC, the requesting agency is responsible for providing food and housing 
for assisting agencies and coordinating communications for all assisting agencies.119  
Within the SMAC, MEMA assumes the role of the coordinator of assistance between 
agencies and maintains records of all participating agencies and agreements.120   
D. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT (EMAC) 
As will be demonstrated later in this document, EMAC assistance in the wake of a 
catastrophic disaster is a critical enabler for state and local governments to continue to 
function.  EMAC is an interstate mutual aid agreement that provides resources to an 
affected region after all local and state resources are overwhelmed.  While an agreement, 
Congress approved EMAC legislation in 1996 and the terms of the agreement are 
monitored by the National Emergency Management Association.121  To invoke support 
under EMAC, the Governor must declare a state of emergency, determine resource 
requirements, and identify specific resources that may be needed.122   
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E. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The cascading effect of these policies at the federal, state and local levels 
impacted response operations and activities in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  
Policies and planning efforts of every organization would be tested by the crisis which 
unfolded after the largest natural disaster in American history.  Debate continues on the 
adequacy of the government performance in Katrina’s aftermath, but few who were 
involved in the response would ever be able to articulate that they were fully prepared for 
devastation of such historic proportions.  The story of the response in Hancock County, 
the least populated yet most besieged county in Mississippi, would serve as a microcosm 
of the successes and failures of America’s response network. 
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V. HANCOCK COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI: HURRICANE KATRINA 
GROUND ZERO 
“I can only imagine this is what Hiroshima looked like 60 years ago.” – 
Governor Barbour123 
A. THE FIRST WAVE: PREPARATION AND DESTRUCTION 
As Hurricane Katrina churned through the Gulf of Mexico after passing over 
south Florida, all local, state, and federal government agencies actively prepared for the 
certain disaster lying in the path of the storm. On Friday, August 26, 2006, Governor 
Haley Barbour of Mississippi declared a State of Emergency, which activated members 
of the Mississippi National Guard and also directed all agencies of the state to “discharge 
their emergency responsibilities” specified within the MEOP.124  On 27 August, the 
Contra-Flow plan was activated to reverse the southbound lanes of Interstates 55 and 59 
to accommodate thousands of evacuees from Mississippi and Louisiana.125  School 
closures were announced for the next week for all districts in the southern portion of the 
state.  As the cone of uncertainty regarding Katrina’s path narrowed, Hancock County 
prepared for the worst.  At 5pm on 27 August, Governor Barbour ordered a mandatory 
evacuation for all residents of Hancock County.126   
Even as these preparations were being made, Katrina continued to surge north and 
strengthen to what would ultimately become a Category V storm, with winds gusting to 
216 miles-per-hour.  On August 29, a National Data Buoy Center buoy located 64 
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nautical miles south of Dauphin Island, Alabama recorded peak wave heights of 55 
feet—the highest ever directly recorded by the NDBC.127 
At approximately 6:10 a.m. on August 29, Katrina made a second landfall near 
Buras, Louisiana with 145 mile per hour winds.  A third landfall came hours later, as 
Katrina’s eye passed directly over the Chandeleur Islands off the Louisiana Coast and 
continued north up the Pearl River, which marks the boundary between Mississippi and 
Louisiana. Katrina arrived in Mississippi packing sustained winds at 125 miles per hour 
and pushing a storm surge greater than twenty-eight feet through the communities of 
Hancock County.128  
 
Figure 5.   Hurricane Katrina Track and Damage Assessment129 
 
The brutal combination of intense winds and surge devastated the Mississippi 
Coast.  President Bush issued a Presidential declaration of a major disaster under the 
Stafford Act for Mississippi on August 29.130  While difficult to measure with precision, 
the surge is estimated to have traveled six miles inland from the coast in many areas, and 
up to twelve miles up many bays and rivers.131  The cities of Hancock County, including 
                                                 
127 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome and Daniel P. Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report (Miami, FL: 
National Hurricane Center, December 20, 2005), 9. 
128 Ibid., 7. 
129 National Geospatial Agency, "NGA Earth," National Geospatial Agency, 
www.hurricaneimagery.org [Accessed January 20, 2006]. 
130 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Presidential Disaster Declaration (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Dept. of Homeland Security, 2005), http://www.fema.gov/news/dfrn.fema?id=4505 
[Accessed January 18, 2006]. 
131 Knabb, Rhome and Brown, Tropical Cyclone Report, 9. 
41 
Pearlington, Waveland, Bay St. Louis, and Diamondhead were scoured by this immense 
force of nature.  The deaths in Mississippi, after the completion of all response 
operations, stood at 224, with fifty-three deaths reported in Hancock County alone.132  
The American Red Cross found that in Hancock County, 10,900 family dwellings were 
completely lost, 3,600 suffered major damage and 1,800 sustained minor damage.133  In 
less than twelve hours, Katrina destroyed nearly sixty-five percent of all 22,363 housing 
units located in Hancock County.134  Throughout the state, 100 percent of all customers 
were without power, including all 45,000 residents of Hancock County.  The entire 
telecommunications system for the coastal region of the state was destroyed, and 
BellSouth reported that 260,000 lines servicing 598,000 customers were affected.135  
Robert Latham, Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency accurately 
assessed that “Katrina will be remembered as one of the most deadly and costly disasters 
in our nation’s history.”136 
B. THE SECOND WAVE: RESPONSE OPERATIONS 
1. A Network Forms from Several Small Worlds 
Prior to Katrina’s landfall, the Hancock EMA Director and staff gathered at the 
EOC location in Bay St. Louis along US Highway 90. Based on their prior experience in 
this hurricane plagued region, they believed that this building was secure even though 
located in the southern portion of the county, despite being only one-half mile west of the 
Bay of St. Louis.  Given its elevation at approximately twenty-six feet above sea level, 
the fact that it survived Hurricane Camille was probably the strongest argument for 
remaining at the EOC.  In the EMA Director’s assessment, the emergency management 
staff was paid to stay behind when everyone else leaves.  Based on their assessment of 
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Katrina’s strength and track, the EMA staff believed that, while it would certainly be 
dangerous in Bay St. Louis, the EOC would be well out of reach of the dangerous storm 
surge.   
Like many small communities, the Hancock County EMA has a minimal staff of 
four full-time employees, one of which is the director.  The EMA Director and staff were 
joined by police and fire representatives from Bay St. Louis and Waveland, MEMA and 
FEMA representatives (although both the MEMA and FEMA liaisons departed for the 
NASA Stennis base prior to Katrina’s landfall), and the local ham radio/public radio 
station remained in the EOC.    In sum, approximately twelve people were present in the 
EOC as Katrina made its final approach north toward the Mississippi coast.  Due to the 
activation of the Mississippi National Guard on 28 August by Governor Barbour, two 
Guardsmen were also present in the EOC.  Their presence would prove critical, as their 
portable satellite telephone system became the only communications lifeline from the 
EOC to the outside world.  All of these positions were filled by native citizens and 
volunteers from the local community—the people in the EOC were colleagues, friends, 
and family who had known each other since childhood.  They shared a common bond 
similar to citizens in most small towns and most had experienced Hurricane Camille 36 
years earlier.  They knew and were familiar with every inch of Hancock County, the 
people, communities, and risks. 
As Katrina moved nearer to shore, phone service was disrupted throughout the 
local area and the only forms of communication from the EOC were through the 
Mississippi National Guard satellite phone and the local ham radio broadcast station 
WQRZ-FM.  When the winds increased during landfall, reaching a peak of 125 miles per 
hour, with gusts to 150, the situation turned dangerous in Bay St. Louis.  Storm surge 
now had moved through and decimated the coastal communities, reaching thirty feet 
according to subsequent NOAA assessments.  Some local citizens who had failed to 
evacuate began futile attempts to flee the flooded streets while the storm was at its fullest 
force.  From the EOC building, the staff witnessed winds tearing apart block after block 
of buildings and surging waters filled US90 up to four feet deep.  Everyone quickly 
realized that Katrina would be much worse than Camille.  They waited, prayed, wrote 
43 
their social security numbers on their arms for identification, and planned for the rescue 
and response operations that would come later. 
As Katrina subsided on the night of August 29, local first responders began to 
assess the immediate damage and take the initial steps to restore their community.  The 
toll on first responders was particularly costly, as virtually every fire and police vehicle in 
Hancock County was damaged beyond repair, further hampering all efforts to marshal an 
effective response.  All public buildings in the City of Waveland were destroyed, 
including the historic city hall and fire and police departments.  The Waveland police 
actually found themselves forced out of the station during the height of the storm and 
survived only by clinging to a bush for five hours.137  With no communications and few 
vehicles available for transportation, the Hancock County EOC began an on-demand type 
service—as people provided information to the EOC personnel (all by face-to-face 
communications because phone, radio and cellular services were out), the EOC personnel 
saved people located nearby in Bay St. Louis.  Transportation was impossible, so most of 
these efforts were conducted on foot as rescue personnel assisted survivors to shelter or to 
the rudimentary medical care that emerged at the Hancock Medical Center.  Even these 
efforts, however limited, were severely hampered by the thousands of flooded vehicles, 
the downed power lines from every utility pole in the region, and millions of tons of 
debris that choked every street in every community.  Eventually, EOC personnel began to 
organize into small groups and linked survivors with the centers for mass care that 
emerged in Bay St. Louis at the Kmart and Wal-Mart parking lots.  No coordination was 
possible by radio—communication and coordination in the first days following Katrina 
was performed strictly through face-to-face meetings either on the street among first 
responders or at the EOC among the staff. 
On August 31, help arrived for the EOC in the form of the Incident Management 
Team 4 from Manatee County, Florida.  Staffed by professional emergency managers 
who were specifically trained to perform a variety of roles in an Incident Command 
System (ICS), IMT4 immediately integrated into the local command and provided the 
                                                 
137 Frances Fragos Townsend, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned.pdf [Accessed February 25, 2006], 127. 
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majority of the staff for the incident command organization.  While providing critical 
assistance to the overwhelmed local victim-responders, IMT4 also brought in a limited 
communications capability in a Recreational Vehicle (RV) that was equipped with a 
satellite phone system.  This RV became a critical conduit for resource requests, as the 
IMT4 staff entered requests into an ADP system named “Tracker” and transmitted to the 
Florida State EOC in Tallahassee.  These requests were then communicated to the 
Mississippi State EOC in Jackson, MS.  All of this activity occurred at a time when the 
Hancock County EOC was largely unusable due to flooding damage, so most 
coordination of operations occurred in the mud and dust filled streets behind the EOC.  
As days passed, other EMAC agencies arrived in RVs to provide assistance at the EOC, 
including the Bolivar County (MS) Fire Department which brought in another satellite 
communications system.  The streets around the EOC became congested with hundreds 
of first responders and vehicles.  Add to this situation the extremely hot weather 
conditions (clear conditions with high temperatures in the mid 90s), open sewage, limited 
sanitation throughout the area, a lack of potable water, no showers, and limited food—
conditions were rough at the EOC, but every day saw some improvements.  Realizing 
that the current location was untenable, the EMA Director and Incident Command staff 
began the process of shifting the EOC to the Alternative Education Center at Stennis 
Airport (located several miles south of the NASA Stennis facility).  The move happened 
on September 4 and, while still without power (meaning no air conditioning) or running 
water, provided a much more flexible base of operations for the EOC that would have to 
support the tremendous influx of support from the nation. 
The Stennis Airport site quickly became the center of the response efforts for the 
entire county as a makeshift city sprouted up overnight.  With the movement of the EOC 
and the arrival of the National Guard Task Force Lee, several thousand responders now 
resided at the very small general aviation facility and the surrounding areas.  Every 
parking lot overflowed with EMAC vehicles, RVs turned into mini-command posts, 
dozens of portable showers and toilets, and hundreds of tents.  The road to the EOC was 
often lined with hundreds of tractor-trailers delivering supplies to the Hancock County 
High School (located adjacent to the Alternative Education Center) and the staging area 
established by FEMA. 
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After flooding to the first floor, the Hancock Medical Center (located in Bay St. 
Louis) staff moved patients outside of the building and provided medical care in a field 
hospital type environment.  People from the entire community straggled into the facility’s 
parking lot in Bay St. Louis, many suffering from a variety of illnesses and injuries.  
Medicinal supplies of all kinds were scarce, and the entire Medical Center’s stores of 
insulin, tetanus, and morphine were lost.  The Eli Lily Corporation of Indianapolis, 
Indiana flew 1500 pounds of medical supplies into Mobile, Alabama on a corporate jet on 
August 31.  These supplies were transported to the Hancock Medical Center by the U.S. 
Coast Guard and were the first relief supplies that arrived into Hancock County. More 
help was on the way.  FEMA DMAT teams arrived on August 30 to assist the medical 
center staff to provide emergent care—and they would remain in the community 
throughout the response  phase, providing a critical resource for the devastated 
community.  The several DMAT teams listed in Table 1 spread throughout the County to 
provide emergent medical care.  Throughout the coming weeks, the Hancock Medical 
Center however became the center of the ESF8 (Medical Care & Public Health) mission. 
Prior to Katrina’s landfall, the FEMA and MEMA representatives to Hancock 
County moved from the EOC to the NASA Stennis facility.  Although the local EMA and 
agencies remained in the EOC location in Bay St. Louis, the state and federal agency 
strategy designated the NASA Stennis facility as the primary base of operations.  Indeed, 
FEMA personnel from around the nation began arriving at the NASA Stennis facility on 
30 August, and the NASA Stennis base would prove to be a crucial staging area for 
resources flowing into the County.  Large U.S. Forest Service (USFS) saw crews began 
to operate south in the Bay St. Louis, Waveland and Pearlington areas, clearing debris 
from the roads to allow emergency transportation.  The USFS teams would ultimately be 
joined in the debris removal by the Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Navy Construction 
Battalion Two, and hundreds of NGO volunteers.  As large shipments of goods became 
available in the community, nearly all of those resources flowed through the NASA 
Stennis site. 
Dozens of citizens, most in a dazed and confused state of shock, began to cluster 
in the locations that would ultimately become the Points of Distribution (PODs) for food, 
water and ice.  The Bayou Talla Church, Save-A-Center, Gulfview Elementary School, 
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Dedeaux School, American Legion Post 58, Charles B. Murphy School, and Wal-Mart 
became the newly established community centers and the primary location for 
interagency mass care efforts.  It was here that a large majority of the NGO work began 
to take shape, as volunteers from faith-based organizations and other volunteer groups 
provided essential services to Katrina victims.  Mobile kitchens, staffed and led by a 
variety of church groups, the Salvation Army, and the American Red Cross, were 
operated in these areas for weeks to feed thousands of meals to the recently homeless.  
By any measure, the amount of material flowing through the network of PODs was 
incredible.  By September 10, 2005, for example, guardsmen distributed over 30,000 
gallons of potable water, 128,000 pounds of ice, and 188,000 Meals Ready to Eat 
(MREs) to Hancock County residents.138 
The critical role filled by the National Guard in Mississippi cannot be overstated.  
The National Guard effort, code named Joint Task Force Cyclone, consisted of a total 
military strength of 12,484 guardsmen.  These troops were organized across several task 
forces:  Task Force Lee operated in Hancock and Pearl River Counties (2141 troops); TF 
Wright in Harrison County (1821 troops), TF Quick in Jackson County (1002 troops), TF 
Keifer covered all other counties (3115 troops), TF Guardian provided military police 
support throughout the state with 1047 troops, and TF Engineer directly supported ESF3 
(Public Works & Engineering) with 1362 troops.  Within Hancock County, TF Lee 
operated the PODs, provided security at dozens of checkpoints throughout the county, 
and completed hundreds of “tailgate missions”—driving into the hardest hit areas of the 
county with water, ice and MREs for Katrina victims. 
Urban Search and Rescue operations followed a different strategy.  While most of 
the other agencies providing support to Hancock County also camped within the county 
limits, US&R teams were based out of the waterpark in adjacent Harrison County.  
Establishing a temporary base in Harrison County created a situation in which the US&R 
teams worked in Hancock, but communicated little with the other entities involved in 
disaster response—they came into the county, conducted operations and left.  
Communications, already tremendously difficult, were made even more challenging 
                                                 
138 Army National Guard, "Joint Task Force Cyclone Operational Briefs" (Powerpoint Briefing Slides, 
Jackson, MS, 2005). 
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because of the remoteness of the US&R base camp.  This physical barrier created 
confusion between the US&R teams and the Hancock EOC, which attempted to 
determine the status of rescue and recovery efforts throughout the County.  Little detailed 
information was exchanged between the US&R teams and the EOC and few local 
resources or people were used by the US&R teams in the search process.  As a 
consequence of these difficulties, Hancock County officials often found themselves 
frustrated by the lack of information available on US&R operations and tasked local 
resources to perform search activities in areas already saturated by the FEMA US&R 
teams. 
Law enforcement operations were primarily coordinated through the EOC by 
representatives from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.  The incident 
command post for law enforcement activities was located in the Kmart parking lot in Bay 
St. Louis, with several EMAC organizations arriving to assist local law enforcement 
agencies to maintain law and order in the community.  As the National Guard troops 
under Task Force Lee arrived in large numbers on September 4, police officers were 
gradually replaced at checkpoints so that they could actively patrol neighborhoods to 
maintain an active law enforcement presence throughout the county. 
Day-by-day, many additional incident command posts were established to meet 
the almost unlimited needs to rebuild Hancock County.  These efforts included thousands 
of government employees from federal, state and local agencies, the private sector 
(BellSouth alone had over 1500 employees working on restoring lines), the military 
(2141 members), and volunteers numbering in the thousands.  A comprehensive 
accounting of all organizations is particularly elusive, because the widespread 
communications problems prevented an accurate recording of organizational strength and 
the chaotic environment severely limited the capture of information in official 
documents.  Much of this information has been compiled as a result of interviews, 
personal accounts, and post-deployment reports from the various agencies. Table 2 below 
is a partial list of the public agencies, private sector organizations, and NGOs worked in 
Hancock County within the two weeks after Katrina’s landfall. 
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Location Description Agencies 
Winn Dixie (Bay St. Louis), 
Chevron (Diamondhead), Dolly’s 
(Kiln), Kmart (Bay St. Louis) 
ESF2 Communications 
Telephone Banks 
Bellsouth, Southern Linc, Alltell, 
Nextel 
Stennis Airport ESF3 Public Works & 
Engineering; Debris Removal 
Army Corps of Engineers, US 
Forest Service, Navy Amphibious 
Construction Battalion 2, 
Christian Life Church, 
Diamondhead Baptist Church, 
Diamondhead Presbyterian 
Church, Diamondhead United 
Method Church, UTURN for 
Christ, Adventist Community 
Team Services, Clermont Harbor 
& Pearlington United Methodist 
Church, Kiln Public Library, 
Voice of Calvary Ministries, 
Word of Faith Christian 
Fellowship, Zuni Hotshot Crew, 
Pearlington Recovery Resource 
Center, Christian Reformed 
World Relief Committee   
Stennis Airport ESF4 Firefighting Osceola County (FL) Fire 
Department, Carbondale & Rural 
Fire Protection District, Bolivar 
County Fire, Chickasaw County 
Fire, City of Luka Fire, City of 
Madison Fire, Sunflower County 
Fire, Fairfax County Fire 
Stennis Airport ESF5 Emergency Management Hancock County EMA, Florida 
IMT Team 4, Nvision, 
Mississippi National Guard, GIS 
Corps 
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Location Description Agencies 
Bay St. Louis Train Depot, Kiln 
Library, Diamondhead Club, Bay 
St. Louis Second Street School 
ESF6 Mass Care, Housing & 
Human Services; Operation Blue 
Roof 
Army Corps of Engineers; 
Samaritan’s Purse, Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 
Diamondhead Baptist Church, 
Adventist Community Team 
Services, UTURN for Christ, 
Diamondhead United Methodist 
Church, Christian Life Church 
North Central Elementary ESF6 Mass Care, Housing & 
Human Services; Shelter 
American Red Cross, Salvation 
Army, World Shelter, Christian 
Life Church, Voice of Calvary 
Ministries, United Way of 
Southern Mississippi, 
Diamondhead United Methodist 
Church, St. Rose de Lima 
Church, Gulf Coast Women’s 
Center for Nonviolence, Victory 
Baptist Church 
Kmart (Bay St. Louis) ESF6 Mass Care, Housing & 
Human Services, Disaster 
Recovery Center 
FEMA 
Kmart (Bay St. Louis), Mcleod 
St. Park, Diamondhead United 
Methodist Church, Dedeaux 
School, Necaise, Winn Dixie, 
Second St. Elementary, Bayou 
Talla Church, Diamondhead Fire 
Department, Hancock North 
Elementary School 
ESF6 Mass Care, Housing & 
Human Services; Mobile Kitchen 
Christian Life Church, 
Woodman, 7th Day Adventist 
Church, Salvation Army, Gulf 
Coast Community Foundation, 
International Aid, Mercy Corps, 
St. Rose de Lima Church, United 
Way, Americorps,  
Bayou Talla Church, Save A 
Center, Gulfview Elementary, 
Dedeaux School, American 
Legion Post 58, Charles B. 
Murphy School, Wal-Mart 
ESF6 Mass Care, Housing & 
Human Services; Points of 
Distribution; 
FEMA, Bay Area Food Bank, 
America’s Second Harvest, HHF 
(His Hands & Feet), Bastrop 
Ministerial Alliance, Christian 
Life Church, Citrus County (FL) 
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Location Description Agencies 
Hurricane Disaster Relief Team, 
Diamondhead Baptist Church, 
Diamondhead Community 
Presbyterian Church, 
Diamondhead United Methodist 
Church  
Hancock Medical Center (Bay St. 
Louis), Kiln Medical Center 
(Kiln), Waveland Health 
Department, Save A Center (Bay 
St. Louis) 
ESF8 Public Health & Medical 
Services 
DMAT Missouri Team 1, DMAT 
Florida Team 6, DMAT Florida 
Team 1, DMAT Strike Team 
Pennsylvania 1, DMAT Strike 
Team Connecticut 1, DMAT 
Strike Team North Carolina 1, 
Medical Center staff, American 
Medical Response, Gulf Coast 
Women’s Center for 
Nonviolence, Center for Disease 
Control,  Christian Life Church, 
Diamondhead Community 
Presbyterian Church, UTURN for 
Christ, Clermont Harbor & 
Pearlington United Methodist 
Church, Word of Faith Christian 
Fellowship, Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints, Gulf 
Coast Missionary Baptist 
Association, Powerhouse of 
Deliverance Ministries, United 
Way of Southern Mississippi, 
The Order of the Good 
Samaritan, Lutheran Disaster 
Response, Pearlington Recovery 
Resource Center,  
Stennis Airport ESF10 Oil and HAZMAT US Environmental Protection 
Agency, US Coast Guard MIC-K 
Mobile, Mississippi Department 
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Location Description Agencies 
of Environmental Quality 
Assessment Team, Mississippi 
Department of Marine Resources, 
National Guard Civil Support 
Team 
Crews operated 24/7 throughout 
Bay St. Louis, Waveland, 
Diamondhead, Kiln, Rock Hill, 
Necaise 
ESF12 Energy Coast Electric, Alabama Power, 
Florida Power and Light 
Kmart (Bay St. Louis), Stennis 
Airport 
ESF13 Public Safety and Security Bay St. Louis Fire Department, 
Waveland Police Department, 
Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, US Coast Guard 
Marine Safety & Security Team 
91108, Hancock County Sheriff 
Office, Federal Protective 
Service, US Marshal Service, 
Mississippi State Police, Ohio 
Army National Guard, 
Mississippi Army National 
Guard, Florida Highway Patrol, 
Missouri Highway Patrol 
Table 2. Location and Type of Response Organizations Present in Hancock County, 
August 29 to September 15, 2005139 
 
2. Communications Infrastructure Failures Severely Impact the Flow of 
Information and Situational Awareness 
As previously mentioned, all forms of communication in Hancock County were 
virtually unusable immediately following Katrina’s landfall and through most of early 
September.  Throughout all of Mississippi, nearly 600,000 Bellsouth customers were 
affected by Hurricane Katrina.  By September 1, service had been restored to over 
                                                 
139 This list of responding agencies is a compilation from several sources, including the Incident 
Action Plans of the Hancock County EOC, the Mississippi State EOC, the Joint Field Office, email from 
NGO volunteer coordinators, IMT4 staff from Manatee County, Florida, and information collected by the 
author while leading U.S. Coast Guard forces in Hancock County until late September 2005. 
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130,000 customers; by September 6 telephone service was restored to over 500,000 
homes.  The situation in Hancock County though, was much more severe, because more 
than one-half of the 23,000 lines remained without service more than two weeks after 
impact.140 
With nearly all telephone and cellular communications out, information traveled 
between organizations by word of mouth and couriers, even well into mid September.  
This inability to communicate between agencies and sectors created an environment that 
made collaboration extremely difficult and time consuming—particularly harmful in a 
situation where time is of the essence.  These conditions enabled the network of the 
response community to evolve into a classic small world network.  Agency 
representatives, serving as the “weak links” between the small worlds of the ESFs and 
command posts, required face-to-face communication to provide information and receive 
mission assignments.  Meetings held twice daily at the EOC permitted the Incident 
Commander to develop operational plans for the next day, however many of these weak 
links were unable to disseminate any of the IAP planning documents to their personnel 
due to power and ADP difficulties.  Ironically, the highest level planning document 
developed by the Incident Commander was often limited in distribution and unavailable 
to the front-line first responders due to a lack of resources at the EOC to make copies.  
Because the community was completely unprepared to establish an alternate EOC and 
coordinate the actions of thousands of first responders, no adequate copying capability or 
process would be available until late September.  Transportation difficulties further 
complicated the performance of the weak links, because they were often required to 
travel across the entire County on roads choked full of debris and downed power lines to 
attend EOC planning meetings. 
The flow of information and knowledge in this environment was particularly 
problematic due to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) failures and the 
resulting communications crisis.  In the early stages of the crisis, some organizations 
(including the EOC), used satellite phones provided by the National Guard, FEMA or one 
of the EMAC or SMAC agencies.  Yet, this reliance on voice communications provided a 
                                                 
140 Hancock County IAP, September 13, 2005. 
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very narrow slice of bandwidth when considering the volume of disaster related 
information that needed to be communicated.  Imagine the Incident Commander 
attempting to summarize all community requirements and interagency actions in the span 
of a phone call to the State EOC or the Joint Field Office.  The ability to transfer large 
amounts of data would not be possible until the EOC servers were recreated making 
email and Internet connectivity possible.  Additionally, the flow of information mandated 
within the ICS also shaped the development of much of the message available to the 
Incident Commander.  After the EOC relocated to the Alternative Education Center, 
IMT4 began to meticulously organize the incident command staff—this organization also 
shaped the flow and aggregation of information as it entered the EOC.  As ESF desk 
representatives acquired information from the variety of command posts and sources, this 
information was sporadically transferred with other elements of the IMT staff, but a 
process was never established that structured this person-to-person collaboration.  
Virtually all of the storage and transfer of information was done manually, on preprinted 
ICS forms, yet none of the forms possess instructions on information sharing.  Further 
inhibiting this collaboration was the composition of the staff, many of whom were 
EMAC personnel from other states who had no preexisting relationship with their 
counterparts.  This mixed bag of disaster related information, little of which was current 
or complete, was consolidated into the Katrina IAP and transmitted daily by fax to the 
State EOC.  Limited paper copies were available for response agencies, as both the time 
to print the IAP and paper were scarce resources.  Unfortunately, no capability existed to 
disseminate the IAP electronically, as no server or email connectivity was possible until 
approximately September 13.  The barriers to effective information flow within the EOC 
were present at the technological, organizational and human levels. 
All of these conditions directly affected the quality of information available to the 
Incident Commander and the staff of the EOC.  While information sources were 
numerous throughout the county (every organization listed in Table 2 could be viewed as 
a possible source), the means to acquire that information by the EOC was not sufficient to 
provide it vertically and horizontally among the network.  Collaboration among the ESF 
desks was often ad hoc, almost always dependent upon the knowledge and insight of the 
ESF representatives to recognize that information presented to them may be applicable to 
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other agencies or functions.  To surmount the telecommunications challenges, the EOC 
established a twice-per-day meeting schedule to coordinate operations throughout the 
entire county.  The analysis of that information by the EOC staff, including the IMT4 
volunteers from Florida and other states, was conducted without the benefit of any ADP 
tools to adequately analyze the reports or the local knowledge to place the information 
into context.  As the information was consolidated to form the IAP, the absence of details 
created a report that contained large generalizations regarding the overall activity and 
plans for the next operational period yet few details.  Even though the IAP was actually a 
generalized plan, no means existed to effectively disseminate it to the broad response 
network residing and working in Hancock County.  All of these factors led to an 
environment in which the Incident Commander, acting on the very thinnest of 
information, made resource and response decisions for the entire community. 
C. EXPOSING AND CLOSING THE GAPS 
Much has, and will be, written in the Katrina postmortem on the wide range of 
agency and leadership successes and failures.141  While the Select Bipartisan Committee 
of the 109th Congress detailed its findings in “A Failure of Initiative” and the White 
House report similarly provided “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned”, much of this analysis focused on the failure of individual agencies and leaders, 
but not the process of disaster management.  This paper attempts to hone in on the 
underlying processes that created an environment of failure, through gaps in policy and 
procedures at all levels and the implementation of flawed policy.  The final analysis of 
Katrina is much too broad and complex an issue to be examined completely in this 
document, however, a critical review of the issues affecting the response network and the 
management of knowledge within that network will be examined.  Before entering into a 
more detailed discussion of the various perspectives of the disaster environment, some 
general observations of the Hancock County case study may provide appropriate context 
for the analytical conclusions drawn in the next chapter. 
1. Accuracy of Planning Assumptions 
Several of the planning assumptions, e.g., evacuees, overwhelmed local resources, 
no common operational picture, etc., contained within the NRP Critical Incident Annex 
                                                 
141 Both the White House and Congressional reports on the government response to Katrina were 
published in late February, too late for a full integration into the analysis of this paper. 
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were accurate as they applied to Hancock County in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  
While accurate, most Americans cannot grasp the sheer enormity of the devastation 
without observing the devastation firsthand.  Many first responders, who witnessed the 
damage from the air, found it difficult to reconcile aerial images with what they found 
later on the ground.  In the event of a future Incident of National Significance (IoNS), the 
NRP planning assumptions could hold true for any scenario involving a Weapon of Mass 
Effect: tens of thousands displaced, a Presidential disaster declaration, significant 
disruption of the critical infrastructure, response capabilities of the local jurisdiction 
overwhelmed and local emergency personnel unable to perform their duties because they 
are also victims.  As indicated above, all first responders in Hancock County were 
immediately overwhelmed and the local government was in peril for several days 
following landfall.  In the final analysis, the NRP determination regarding overwhelmed 
local resources should consider the concept that virtually no government exists at ground 
zero. 
2. Disparity in Local Capabilities 
As characterized in the NRP and NIMS, the EOC and local executive assume 
critical roles in coordinating local incident management actions and implementing 
Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans after a major catastrophe.  Counties throughout 
the nation should not be considered as equals, in terms of technical sophistication or 
resources, and this imbalance places an even greater burden on the state and federal 
government to respond proactively to an IoNS.  Consistency of response must be built in 
at the Federal level, because the wide disparity of state and local government capabilities 
and resources directly translates into varying degrees of resiliency.  Many large cities are 
likely to have a sufficient staff and facility to respond initially—but that is likely not to be 
the case for many small cities which may have lost their EOC and whose first responders 
are also victims.  In this environment, as observed in Hancock County, the majority of 
initial response actions will be chaotic and uncoordinated until the local EOC is 
reestablished as the core entity for emergency management and community recovery. 
3. Few Alternatives Exist if Local COOP Fails 
Historically, and within the current National Response Plan, local emergency 
management agencies are responsible for providing support and coordination to response 
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activities, yet no concrete alternatives are offered in the national or state policy 
documents that replace, in totality, the function of the local EOC.  The efficacy of the 
NRP is based on the proper functioning of the local organization, which enables the state 
and federal agencies to take action, as appropriate.  If the local entities are overwhelmed, 
the entire response system will begin to break down until such a time as a local (or 
possibly state or military) organization regains control of the response efforts.  In the 
Hancock County situation, while the local government and emergency management 
operation were overwhelmed, no precise mechanism was triggered in the MEOP that 
initiated a transfer of emergency management functions and responsibility to the State.  
Even more difficult is the political issue involved in this decision, as the general premise 
that all disasters are local is a common view and any attempt to control the event by 
outside entities will likely be rejected by the local community and elected officials. 
4. EMAC Support is Essential 
Hundreds, if not thousands, of EMAC volunteers like the IMT4 Team from 
Manatee County Florida became an essential resource that was immediately available to 
support the local first responders in Hancock County.  EMAC agencies arrive to the 
disaster area with extensive training in both the Incident Command System and their 
specific area of expertise, whether it is firefighting, public safety, mass care, etc.  While 
possessing significant technical knowledge, they will often lack local knowledge or the 
long-term personal relationship developed among the community of local first 
responders.  The overnight arrival of thousands of responders from every corner of the 
nation fuels an already chaotic response environment and many EMAC agencies are 
likely to begin working with a limited knowledge of the vast network of other agencies 
operating in their immediate vicinity.  A post-deployment survey conducted by EMAC is 
particularly revealing of the challenges faced in a major disaster.  Of the top ten 
difficulties faced by the respondents, five of the ten dealt with communications issues 
that affected the organization (e.g., poor communication, miscommunication, and lack of 





of adequate maps of the area; inadequate lines of communication; personnel not qualified 
for mission assignment; and took too long to deploy resources, equipment and 
personnel.)142 
EMAC personnel, pushed to the forefront by the absence of the local first-
responders, may be placed in the awkward situation of coordinating local activities 
among a network of unfamiliar agencies, with no functioning communication system, in 
territory that is foreign to most.  All of these factors inhibit the natural formation of 
collaborative working groups among the ESF communities.  What results is the 
devolution of the response network into isolated pockets which consist of familiar 
organizations, yet any horizontal flow of information is stunted by organizational and 
technical limitations.  Without a method to easily bridge the agency or sector divide, the 
EMAC organizations, and the other organizations of the response network, will acquire 
small world characteristics and be linked to other efforts and agencies by the weakest of 
links.  These weak links may be further limited in their efficient exchange of information 
because face-to-face communication is required in most situations.  This factor not only 
makes active, on-going coordination of activities more difficult, but it also limits the 
amount of information that is relevant at the time of the exchange—information is either 
dated or too vague. 
5. Integration of Military into Response Command 
Many state and local government officials are likely to be confused over the role 
of the Armed Forces and many will assume that the military will exercise a primary 
command-and-control role due to the introduction of a large contingent of troops.  
Although the perception may exist that the military is in command of the incident (as 
evidenced by LTG Honore’s adventures in the Katrina and Rita response), the reality is 
quite different.  Military forces engage only when requested by the state and maintain a 
separate and distinct chain-of-command linked to the United States Northern Command.  
A clear break from the local incident command is maintained and reiterated in the NRP.  
The military units that arrive after a catastrophic incident will far outnumber any local 
emergency personnel, making it even more attractive for the military to be considered as 
                                                 
142 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, http://test.emacweb.org/?866 [Accessed February 
18, 2005] 
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the solution for all problems and an available pool of manpower for some jobs that they 
may be ill suited to perform.  In Hancock County, over 2000 National Guard troops (and 
many more in type-specific task forces, such as the military police) directly assisted the 
local community by staffing PODs, manning checkpoints, clearing debris, etc.  While 
these military units provide critical services that the local community can no longer offer, 
coordinating operations between military and other organizations (whether they be 
EMAC, private sector or NGOs) continues to be challenging.  Two reasons drive these 
difficulties: the operation of different communications systems (on the technological 
level) and the parallel chain-of-command that reinforces civilian-military agency 
stovepipes (on the organizational level).  While the National Guard and other military 
units are critical to response and recovery efforts (as shown in the Hancock County 
example), the command-and-control issue between civil and military authorities under 
the NRP is likely to remain unclear at the tactical level of the incident. 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. A NEW WAY OF THINKING 
In “Networks and Netwars”, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt proposed that 
hierarchical organizations often fail when combating a determined and highly networked 
adversary.  Stretching this analogy over the Katrina landscape, one can assume that most 
government agencies operate today in a highly networked environment of stakeholders.  
While certainly not netwar, perhaps the crisis environment rests somewhere between 
netwar and the normal environment of stable operations.  There is clearly no intention by 
any entity to attack the public or our infrastructure as would be the netwar case, but a 
network forms nonetheless in response operations, much of the network is currently 
designed to be outside the control of the Incident Commander.  Do we have the luxury 
during the response to an Incident of National Significance (IoNS) to have resources that 
are not synchronized?  Katrina clearly answered no. 
To further analyze the composition and operation of networks, Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt developed a framework of characteristics based on the organization (structure), 
narrative (founding principles), doctrine (policy and process), technology (systems) and 
social (cultural) views.  While the authors designed this model to evaluate enemy 
networks, it may be useful to further decompose and explain the complex and 
interdependent network which forms in the wake of a major disaster.  Analyzing the 
response community in this way may provide an opportunity to consider a different 
perspective than the current government-centric approach.  Rather, a network view will 
highlight the strategic importance of institutionalizing multi-channel collaboration and 
require significant changes to the existing Information, Communications and Technology 
infrastructure that will enable broader collaboration.  In the future, organizational agility, 
information superiority and comprehensive resource unity of effort will be critical in 
maintaining a comparative advantage in prevention and response activities to counter 
threats to homeland security.  Within the context of this paper, the analysis of network 
and knowledge management is limited to the organizational, doctrinal and technological 
aspects of the Arquilla/Ronfeldt model. 
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Before tendering analytical observations, it may be best to restate the key research 
objectives of this thesis:  1) How does emergency response policy of federal, state, and 
local governments address the growth of the social network of first responders after an 
Incident of National Significance (IoNS)?, 2) What are the characteristics of the ad hoc 
network that develops and how does the response topology enable organizational 
interoperability and resiliency?, 3) How does the significant devastation of all 
communication systems impact the response network?, and 4) To what degree is the 
decision-making process of the Incident Commander or Unified Command impacted by 
knowledge environment of the management staff? 
B. THE DOCTRINAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Analysis:  Top-Down Hierarchy in a Network Environment 
The first research question focuses on the concept of how response policy shapes 
the formation of the network at all levels in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident.  In 
this highly dynamic environment, the NIMS and NRP create a top-down hierarchy of 
incident management by doctrine and procedure.  The coordinating mechanism contained 
in Figure 4, when translated into the terms of network theory, could be construed as a 
series of nodes and links.  Within this network, the local EOC assumes the role of the 
central hub of the entire network and possesses the more links to other organizations 
(nodes) than any other node within the network.  If we consider the response community 
as a scale-free network and follow Barabasi’s theory of hubs, the network development 
meets the two laws of the real network—real growth and preferential attachment.  The 
network, as clearly demonstrated in Hancock County, continues to grow and add other 
nodes of response organizations, and most will preferentially attach via weak links to the 
local EOC. 
At the federal and state levels, the NRP and NIMS solidify an interagency 
environment in which authorities and jurisdiction are stable and well-defined.  This stable 
environment is effective when the environment is static—hierarchies are well suited for 
this type of activity.  Yet this approach fails to display the agility and flexibility needed at 
the tactical level of a major disaster because the environmental conditions have changed 
due to the overwhelming devastation, the loss of local resources and the inability to 
communicate.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt observed that a hierarchal organization when 
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introduced into this environment will, in all likelihood, fail to maintain pace with current 
events.  The reliance on centralized decision-making and command-and-control 
characterize the top-down, hierarchical approach to operations and the process-focus that 
is consistent with most bureaucracies.  This centralized decision making process is highly 
dependent upon disaster-related knowledge and timely communications, both of which 
no longer exist.  Disaster knowledge, designed to move vertically to decision makers, 
typically arrives late, often lacks specifics, and is irrelevant or incorrect by the time of its 
arrival. 
2. Analysis:  More than an Incident Command 
With respect to research question number two, most incidents will be managed by 
local officials, even though hundreds of new agencies have arrived on scene with 
thousands of first responders and volunteers.  This concept of local control is the pillar of 
emergency management that is reflected through statutes and policies at the federal and 
state levels.  The local officials are also victims.  Many of these people may not be 
capable, whether from shock or lack of expertise, of providing the necessary direction 
and leadership to the enormous influx of resources.  Both examples surfaced in Hancock 
County, as the four-person emergency management staff became the head of a monolithic 
organization they were ill prepared to lead.  This combination of the inability to function 
(due to victimization) and the inability to lead (due to the massive change in 
organizational structure and complexity) reinforces the premise that the response is 
simply too large and diverse for a single Incident Commander to effectively manage.  
The decision continuum at all levels of planning, from the NRP to the local, is unclear 
how to transition from Incident Command to Unified Command and the formation of a 
Unified Command is left to the discretion of the local officials. 
3. Analysis:  Response Lacks a Knowledge Management Strategy 
How information is collected, stored, analyzed and translated into knowledge is 
the central argument of research question four.  Both the NIMS and NRP lightly address 
the management of information throughout the network.  While NIMS mentions 
Information Management and Communications as a high priority within the structure, it 
is not specifically assigned an organizational task within the framework.  The NRP 
approaches information management in a similar fashion by vaguely referencing the 
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development of the “common operating picture,” but not specifically placing the 
development of the COP at any level of the response network.  As mentioned earlier, this 
lack of definition of knowledge management at the federal levels permits a similar laissez 
faire treatment at the state and local levels.  Ultimately, the result is a fragmented 
approach to acquiring, analyzing and storing disaster information and creating and 
translating knowledge to fuel the decision-making process. 
Even more fundamental is the fact that no organization, within NIMS or the NRP, 
is assigned the functional responsibility to holistically manage knowledge.  The 
Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Operations Plan does focus some attention on 
information management, and further describes the process of collecting and providing 
disaster-related information within the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to support 
the overall planning process.  What is reflected in policy is a KM system that does more 
than simply support organizational elements in the collection and dissemination of 
information.  No comprehensive approach, however, exists for the management of 
disaster-related knowledge that spans horizontally across ESFs or vertically among 
organizational levels.  This failure to specify responsibility for knowledge management 
directly impacts on the decision-making process of the Incident Command.  While data 
continuously flows through the Incident Command System on predesignated and highly-
formatted documents, no specific entity within the system is responsible for managing 
how the situational assessments are formed.  The ICS is focused on the content of the 
disaster message, not on the process by which it was developed.  This lack of rigor in 
developing situational awareness and knowledge may create a false “truth” for senior 
leaders that is contingent upon the accuracy and timeliness of the information and drive 
the allocation and request for resources.  The lack of a Knowledge Management Strategy 
(KMS) at the federal level begets a similar void at the state and local levels as agencies 
align their efforts with an incomplete national plan. 
4. Recommendation:  Streamline the Relationship between the Local 
EOC, the Incident Commander, Unified Command and Area 
Command in the NRP 
Particularly in light of the chaos that ensues after a catastrophe, the current 
response policy should be amended to streamline and simplify the roles and relationship 
between critical command-and-control elements.  First responders can ill afford the time 
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to navigate through an arcane and confusing web of roles and responsibilities, especially 
when faced with the challenges to communication and collaboration that were present in 
a situation such as Hancock County.  Organizational simplicity and unity of effort is 
essential and several changes should be integrated into the National Response Plan and 
Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA).  As mentioned above, for truly catastrophic 
situations, a single Incident Commander is likely to be incapable of effectively managing 
the response efforts.  Two primary changes are required to simplify and clarify these 
relationships:  
a. The NRP-CIA Should Mandate the Establishment of a Unified 
Command at the Local Level to Broaden Emergency 
Management Capability and Perspective   
Too much discretion is left to the local incident management personnel 
and officials to determine if a Unified Command should be established following an 
IoNS.  The entire response effort builds on the foundation of their decisions—yet 
deciding when to change organizational form to a Unified Command (perhaps one of the 
most vaguely defined decisions) due to the complexity of the disaster is left to chance.  
Just as the CIA identifies specific response actions, the determination that a Unified 
Command be established at the local level should dovetail with the Presidential Disaster 
Declaration. 
b. The Unified Command Entity Should Be Merged with the Area 
Command and This Organization Should Be Located at the 
Local EOC 
The merger of the Area Command and Unified Command will resolve an 
unclear seam in response policy and clarify organizational responsibilities for emergency 
management.  In concert with this restructuring, the role of the EOC should be expanded 
to include command-and-control of response efforts, beyond merely supporting and 
coordinating operations.  This shift in roles for the EOC comes at the expense of the Area 
Command, but it removes the command-and-control element from the ad hoc 
organization and assigns it to the organization that is a permanent and fixed element of 
the response network.  Particularly after a major disaster, and applying the lessons from 
Hancock County as an appropriate example, the response community forms around the 
EOC and this enables the preferential attachment of links within the response network.  
While the NRP currently treats the EOC as a coordinating entity, in the context of the real 
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network, EOCs become the network hub that continues to function when many other 
infrastructure nodes have been destroyed.  As more organizations are drawn to the EOC, 
the network will become more cohesive, collaboration will be improved, and unity of 
effort achieved. 
5. Recommendation:  Integrate a Knowledge Management Strategy 
within the NIMS and NRP 
Mastering the creation and translation of disaster knowledge should be viewed as 
a critical element to sustain comparative advantage for future response efforts.  
Comparative advantage in this discussion is relative, because in the private sector, 
comparative advantage equates to maintaining an edge over competitors.  In disaster 
operations, however, comparative advantage should be considered in terms of 
maintaining an edge over the situation itself—does the Unified Command possess a solid 
grasp of what has happened, what is happening and what will happen?  Improved 
technical capabilities will always be developed, but how we apply disaster knowledge 
will determine the success of our future response and serve as a catalyst of organizational 
change.   
The ability to develop and master knowledge must be articulated in policy at the 
federal level, so that state and local emergency procedures address the development of a 
common operating picture.  One alternative may be to create a Knowledge Management 
Unit within the NIMS structure that would have the specific function of determining:  
disaster information requirements, information sources, analytical and collaborative 
processes, retention and recall requirements, and how knowledge is transmitted 
throughout the network.  Close cooperation with the Communications and Situation Units 
would be required in developing and maintaining awareness of evolving disaster 
operations and conditions.  A major element of the Knowledge Management Unit would 
be to develop and integrate the disaster data elements into the Common Operating Picture 
(COP) and make it accessible for the entire response network, both horizontally and 
vertically. 
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C. THE ORGANIZATION PERSPECTIVE 
1. Analysis:  Collaboration is Ill Defined at All Levels 
The characteristics of the response network address the heart of the second 
research question.  The NIMS and NRP lack details regarding the development of the 
network among the private sector, NGOs and local officials.  While some efforts exist at 
the federal level (such as the Department of Homeland Security Office of State and Local 
Coordination), little information is available to support any systematic attempt to develop 
a broad effort of collaboration between government and either the private sector or NGOs 
beyond the integration of the American Red Cross into the disaster community.  
Although this collaborative approach has gained some momentum within the Department 
of Homeland Security (particularly in the field of critical infrastructure assessment and 
protection), the full integration of public and non-public activities has not occurred.  
While the NGOs and private sector provide critical resources to the response effort, the 
lack of a coherent top-to-bottom policy exacerbates the divide between the two sides.  
The gap created by a lack of comprehensive collaborative effort limits the process and 
knowledge interoperability of the entire response network. 
2. Analysis: A Broad National Effort Requires a Redefinition of the 
Response Network 
While HSPD5, NIMS and the NRP provide a hierarchical approach to incident 
management, the response environment in America has changed.  Rapid situational 
awareness among all levels of the response organization is expected to focus resources on 
the most critical areas of the disaster.  At the Hancock County EOC, the Mississippi 
EOC, the Joint Field Office, the Homeland Security Operations Center, and the White 
House, immediate feedback was needed to support the decision making process.  The 
presumption within the NRP that a clear understanding of the situation at the incident site 
will not be gained for 24 to 48 hours is no longer valid.  The crushing and all-consuming 
drive for information from the White House to the Unified Command requires a 
tremendous degree of granularity and diversity much of which is outside the span of 
control of the government agencies leading the response.  NGOs have a tremendous 
amount of information on mass care efforts, telecommunications companies on 
infrastructure damage and capabilities, utility companies on the rate of repair of electrical 
service.  The resulting adhocracy which, while under government leadership, draws 
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heavily on private sector agencies to provide essential services for the displaced masses.  
As in Hancock County, NGOs fill critical roles to provide relief and assistance and are 
often unencumbered by the bureaucratic restrictions of government agencies.  They are 
agile, leverage the power of the internet to build support for their efforts, and can be 
expected to respond immediately to the disaster area.  Currently, while NIMS and the 
NRP account for the integration of the private sector and NGOs into the response efforts, 
this policy should be altered to integrate them as full partners into the disaster response 
organization.  Homeland security is transforming from a government service to a shared 
system of values and culture throughout America (public and private alike).  Although 
this thesis does not specifically address the goal of preventing terrorism, response 
operations and prevention actions at the tactical level are so intertwined it is often 
difficult to determine a difference.  Most of the players involved in preventing terrorism 
are the first responders, whether they are from the fire service, law enforcement or 
medical profession.  The distinction between prevention and response at the local level is, 
in many ways, immaterial to the operation of the network—the network continues to 
grow and form, conducting both prevention and response activities. 
As the response to a major disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina unfolds, how 
the network evolves should be considered in future discussions of response policy.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt theorize that a hybrid approach to network-centric operations in 
which hierarchies and networks are used by governments may be the most successful 
strategy when facing a networked adversary.143  Perhaps the use of the hierarchies is 
sufficient at the federal and state levels because of the stable environment, but crisis 
conditions at the local level should lead us to consider employing an all-channel network 
to improve organizational agility and resilience. 
3. Analysis:  The Local Network Integrates Small Worlds, Hubs and 
Weak Links 
Most people and organizations develop and maintain close ties with others that 
have a similar culture and background.  This affinity certainly applies for many of the 
response organizations which were present in Hancock County: the US&R teams formed 
                                                 
143 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 327, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/ [Accessed 
January 12, 2006]. 
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a cohesive unit, as did the National Guard, as did the law enforcement officers, etc.  
When the network continues to grow nodes of a similar type, internal communication and 
links between similar organizations will be quite dense.  Within these groups, inertia 
prevents the easy development of weak links, but it is the weak ties that binds the entire 
network together and creates network resiliency.  More will be discussed from the 
technology perspective in the next section, but the weak links operating between agencies 
are faced with a tremendous communications challenge and often rely on face-to-face 
interaction to exchange information and guidance.  The lack of a collaborating 
communications capability severely restricted the full integration of a broader response 
community into the effort led by the Hancock EOC.  More will be presented on 
technology later in this section. 
The development of the small worlds is directly forecast by the network evolution 
proofs identified by Watts and Barabasi.  To further analyze the vulnerability of the entire 
network, an assessment of the risk to the EOC could be beneficial.  Viewing the EOC as 
the primary network hub through a fault-tree tool would integrate the following threats 
into the model: human failures (responders as victims), technological failures 
(communication infrastructure devastation) and process failures (no effective Knowledge 
Management System to shape situational awareness).  As mentioned in the implications 
in Chapter V, the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) for any local EOC gains 
national scrutiny (under the very worst conditions), because the entire national response 
effort is based on the local government functionality that is manifested at the local hub.  
If the local EOC fails, there is a high likelihood that the response system will suffer a 
cascade failure, as Katrina clearly demonstrated. 
4. Recommendation:  Expand Local Unified Command to Include 
Government, Private Sector and NGO Leaders 
The NIMS and the NRP provide the basic structure for the Unified Command 
concept, yet changes are required to leverage all the capabilities of the response network 
that evolves after a major disaster.  Bill Carwile, the FCO for Katrina response in 
Mississippi, advocated an expansion of the Unified Command concept in his reflections 
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on his experience at the Joint Field Office.144  While the traditionally defined Unified 
Command includes a diverse assembly of government partners, maybe an expanded 
definition of the Unified Command should integrate all agencies, or their representatives, 
operating in the community.  Civilian government resources, as identified previously, are 
only a portion of the network that will respond to an event—many organizations will 
arrive in the local community and begin to work, often outside of the visibility of the 
Unified Command.  Developing a linkage to the private sector and NGOs is critical to 
develop the single unified approach envisioned in HSPD5.  Local incident commands 
should be expanded from the government-centric current form, to include, at a minimum, 
private sector and NGO leaders.  In the context of Hancock County, this could have taken 
on several different forms, but much of the formation of the Unified Command could be 
the result of an ongoing effort to build cross-sector collaboration in emergency 
management.  Maybe this attempt at building consensus among the community would put 
the local elected official in the Unified Command with the emergency management 
director.  Another version could possibly call for the president of the Chamber of 
Commerce to serve as the private sector representative.  Forming this collaborative effort 
might include the integration of utility and energy companies (whether BellSouth or 
Mississippi Power).  Regarding NGOs in the Unified Command, one alternative could be 
to designate the coordinator of the Gulf Coast Interdenominational Disaster Task Force to 
serve as the representative.  Or perhaps the senior-most leader of the Salvation Army 
could fill that role.  Many possibilities exist to build a broader coalition that moves 
beyond a government-only solution and taps into the resources of the wider community.  
Integrating and collaborating at the command level, as well as the incident command post 
level, will move the entire network closer to knowledge and process interoperability. 
5. Recommendation:  Designate EOCs as Critical Infrastructure as the 
Primary Hubs of the Scale-Free Response Network 
Based on the presumption that the local response network is scale-free because of 
the growing network and its preferential attachment of links to the EOC, “hardening” the 
EOC becomes a paramount concern to prevent a cascading failure of the entire response 
                                                 
144 William L. Carwile, “Unified Command and the State-Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina in 
Mississippi,” Homeland Security Affairs I, no. 6 (2005). http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss2/art6 [Accessed 
January 20, 2006] 
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network.  While the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets identifies Emergency Response as critical sector, the aim of the program is 
focused on interoperable communications at the incident level.  This gap existed for 
years, but drew significant attention after the tragic communications failures partially 
contributed to first responder deaths on 9/11.  Despite the emphasis on improving the 
technological capability and doctrine to effectively use these resources, any consideration 
of the response network as a “system of systems” has been absent from policy.  
Interoperability, as envisioned by the SAFECOM, is focused on voice communication 
interoperability, not the flow of knowledge throughout an interoperable network that 
extends beyond the first responder at the scene of an incident.  Because the entire 
response network so heavily relies on the proper functioning of the local EOC during 
major disasters, expanding the Emergency Response segment of the national strategy to 
include local and state EOCs would be beneficial.  With respect to hardening the EOC 
against the three system faults identified earlier, there may be some movement occurring 
in this direction already.  To offset human failures due to victimization, the use of EMAC 
Incident Management Teams prestaged to staff and run the EOC may prevent the 
possibility of a system failure.  Regarding the technological fault, satellite telephones 
were sporadically used in Mississippi to support senior decision-makers within the EOCs, 
but a more comprehensive solution is offered in the next section.  Finally, with respect to 
the process fault, the adoption of a Knowledge Management strategy and creation of a 
KM Unit within the NIMS structure should close the knowledge process gap. 
D. THE TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Analysis:  Limited View of Interoperable Communications 
The third research question addressed the impact of telecommunications on the 
response effort.  Telecommunications shortfalls cut through the Katrina response in two 
ways: first, by too narrowly defining the nodes of the network supported by the 
government program, and second, on the traditional over-reliance on ICT systems and not 
a more holistic approach to the hard and soft sides of the Knowledge Management 
system.  The resulting impact of these communications failures affected every member of 
the network, regardless of position.   
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Efforts within the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets focused on solving the problems of 9/11 with respect to interoperable 
communications—defined as tactical voice networks for first responders.  Unfortunately, 
initiatives like SAFECOM have made little progress to develop a comprehensive national 
system of interoperability.  The SAFECOM effort though is even more limited because of 
the narrow definition of first responder—most of the response network of Katrina would 
fall outside the umbrella of SAFECOM.  What is needed is a broad, open response 
network that ties together government agencies, the private sector, NGOs and even the 
military.  While the NRP envisions a broad, national response to catastrophic incidents 
that encompasses all of these elements, the current communications strategy reinforces 
government-introduced cultural barriers to collaboration and cooperation. 
2. Analysis:  All-Channel Flow of Information is Needed 
As envisioned in the NIMS, the development of the IAP is critical to the planning 
process of the incident.  Yet the development of the IAP is linked to the ability of the 
local jurisdiction to effectively plan.  As the situation in Hancock County developed 
during Katrina, the devastation at the EOC directly influenced the ability of the Incident 
Commander or Unified Command to capture information and transfer that knowledge to 
the State EOC, the JFO and the entire network.  At the initial stages of the disaster, voice 
reports of the situation are insufficient to describe the magnitude of the devastation and 
the resources required.  Written reports, copied and disseminated to a relatively small 
number of key leaders, are insufficient to effectively convey all the disaster related 
information to members of the response community.  An improved method of 
communicating information throughout the network is needed that permits both 
horizontal and vertical communication in a variety of methods.  While the federal 
initiative to design an interoperable communications system focuses on the development 
of voice systems, the possibility of developing a system that encompasses both voice and 
data is a clear requirement for major catastrophes. 
The fourth research question focused on the KM system and how its performance 
affected the decision-making of the Incident Commander.  Perhaps the ICS planning 
process, culminating in the development of the IAP, is the closest kin to a KMS within 
the NIMS and NRP landscape.  This flow of information within most EOCs relies on the 
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exchange of hardcopy paper forms (for example, ICS form 201 is the Incident Action 
Plan form, ICS 214 is a Requisition Request form, etc.) within or among Emergency 
Support Functions.  Completing these forms is a learned practice, in terms of capturing 
the content and the manner of transmission.  It also may limit the all-channel flow of 
situational awareness throughout the response organization because it places the decision 
for translating the information in the hands and head of the ESF representative.  As these 
reports are developed, the information is aggregated to develop a comprehensive 
operational plan for the next period.  Who determines what details drop out of the 
process?  Is there a system or structure to this aggregation, or does it merely reside in the 
mind of the ESF representative who makes the decision at the time of the writing of the 
IAP?  Does the ESF representative, who is likely either a local responder-victim or an 
outside EMAC professional, have a clear understanding of the context of the information 
they have acquired, analyzed, stored, aggregated and translated?  Many of these issues 
should be considered as the response community begins to shift focus on the process by 
which knowledge is acquired and shared.  While the NIMS enables and supports the 
development of limited information, the design and flow of knowledge throughout the 
organization is problematic and lacking a coherent strategy. 
3. Analysis:  Voice Communications are Insufficient to Provide a 
Common Operating Picture 
Imagine the frustration of the Unified Command in Hancock County in the weeks 
after Katrina.  A prolonged inability to communicate severely hampered interagency 
coordination, the acquisition and identification of resources and material desperately 
needed by the community, and the inefficient allocation of available capabilities.  Some 
agencies doubled their efforts in conducting US&R searches, while other portions of the 
County were left untouched because of poor communications and coordination.  While a 
limited number of satellite phones were immediately available to the Unified Command 
staff, any communications via voice captures a message between only two members of 
the response network.  After the conversation is concluded, it then became incumbent 
upon each member to share their insight and understanding of the conversation, strategy, 
etc. with the other members of the Unified Command.  This preoccupation with voice 
communications (stemming directly from 9/11, HSPD5, the NSPCIKA, and the 
SAFECOM initiative) belies the real technological gap:  in a massive catastrophe and 
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response, data communications pushed through broadband systems between command-
and-control elements may be more critical as voice communications.  For certain, tactical 
voice communications interoperability should not be eliminated from the national 
strategy, but our focus should further examine the comprehensive requirement from the 
perspective of knowledge interoperability.  Do the knowledge requirements of the local 
EOC, State EOC, and JFO better align with the delivery of detailed disaster information 
by data, rather than voice?  Perhaps a combination of both is best, yet it is clear that the 
national priority is voice interoperability between first responders at the incident.  
Knowledge interoperability between command centers is not even reflected or considered 
in the Emergency Response sector of the NSPCIKA. 
4. Technological Recommendation:  Integrate Hastily Formed Networks 
(HFN) and Mesh Networks as Federal Disaster ICT Initiative 
David Lancaster and the Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) team at the Naval 
Postgraduate School developed and implemented an ICT capability to fill the immediate 
communications gap after the Indonesian Tsunami in December 2005 and Katrina.145  
HFN deployments have proven successful, although on a limited scale with respect to the 
comprehensive disaster response network.  It is the time to elevate the idea to national 
prominence.  HFN, as defined by Lancaster, allows for a “global, broadband rapidly 
deployable network node complete with Internet reach-back, voice, data and video 
capability.”146  At a minimum, this is the type of communications requirement for each 
local EOC defined within the NRP framework.  This capability will serve to “harden” the 
EOC node—the network will grow around the EOC and as additional resources flow into 
the area, preferentially attach to it.  This capability would permit all the members of the 
Unified Command staff to immediately communicate disaster assessments, resource 
requirements and emerging issues within the local EOC, to the state EOC, and to the JFO.  
Comprehensive situational awareness at all command levels should be the goal and it is 
attainable with the expansion of the application of the HFN concept.  That, however, is 
only the initial phase in the transition to complete knowledge interoperability.                                                    
145 David D. Lancaster, "Developing a Fly-Away-Kit (FLAK) to Support Hastily Formed Networks 
(HFN) for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)," (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California), 1-71, 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/Sat+Jan+14+17:26:33+PST+2006/SIRSI/0/518/0/05Jun_Lancast
er.pdf/Content/1?new_gateway_db=HYPERION [Accessed January 14, 2006]. 
146 Ibid., 2. 
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Beyond the confines of the EOC, an enormous and complex response network 
exists—hundreds, perhaps thousands, of information sources are available that form and 
shape the collective understanding of the disaster situation and response.  Linking these 
sources, and resources, via the HFN to the local EOC will create a more cohesive 
response network that bridges all sectors and disciplines.  In the future, most responders 
will arrive at the site of a disaster with the essentials to begin working: transportation, 
some food and water, portable lodging, and a communications/ADP capability.  Imagine 
if the responders who arrive to work for an NGO, bringing a portable laptop computer 
with them on their deployment, could instantly communicate via email or instant 
messaging with their counterpart on the EOC staff.   
Taking this concept one step further, Motorola Corporation (as far back as 2003) 
offered a Mesh Networks Enabled Architecture (MEA) technology solution that enabled 
“end users to instantly form a broadband wireless network among each other.”147  This 
solution allows users to move seamlessly between infrastructure-based and peer-to-peer 
networks.  The proprietary system designed by Motorola is obviously limited by contract, 
i.e., it is not an open system designed for use by any and all members of a community.  
However, in the situation of a major disaster, the MEA solution is very much what the 
entire network needs to initiate broad collaboration among all partners.   
Many options for progress exist to make this network system a reality.  One 
alternative is for the federal government to assume a leadership role, even at the local 
level, to deliver an MEA-like system that links all members of the network.  Another 
possibility would be fielding that expeditionary capability under the direction of the 
states.  A third alternative would be to field a robust similar capability to all EOCs and 
communities, however the sheer magnitude of that undertaking is likely cost-prohibitive.  
The preferred alternative of these is for federal government leadership: state and local 
personnel are far too overwhelmed with executing the actions of disaster response and 
tending to their own needs, to be burdened with fielding a complex, yet critical 
communications system.  Communications at the local level must be restored as soon as 
possible after the disaster—any delay greatly increases the possibility of a system failure 
                                                 
147 Lancaster, "Developing a Fly-Away-Kit (FLAK) to Support Hastily Formed Networks,” 58. 
74 
of the response network.  Fielding an MEA-like system under federal leadership may 
prevent that from occurring and establish an environment of collaboration that ties 
together all elements of the response network under a Unified Command. 
5. Recommendation:  Design and Implement a Response Knowledge 
Management System 
Throughout this document, several sources have stressed the critical role 
knowledge plays as an organization’s only sustaining enabler of future success.  
Although the private sector has taken significant steps to realize this in redesigning 
organizational structures and processes, most public agencies have not implemented 
similar KM systems.  Further complicating the issue for the response network is its ad 
hoc nature.  This diverse network forms quickly under different conditions, locations, and 
leadership.  Every disaster is unique and each complex in its own way.  How can an 
effective KM system be implemented in this situation, when so many elements are fluid?   
Once again, the EOC takes on a central role in the development and integration of 
a KM system.  When viewed from a physical perspective, the local EOCs and state EOCs 
are the only fixed locations represented in Figure 4, the coordinating framework of the 
NRP.  All of the other organizations are moving targets and shaped by the situation.  This 
fluid situation requires a more comprehensive and thoughtful approach to designing and 
implementing a KM system in this environment.  Within the NIMS, the creation of a 
Knowledge Management Unit should be considered to assign organizational 
responsibility.  Within the NRP, the development of the KM strategy should be included 
as a supporting annex that is on par with other annexes regarding Financial Management, 
Logistics, Private-Sector Coordination, Public Affairs, and Volunteers and Donations, 
etc.  This elevation of the visibility of KM in the two central policies of the federal 
government will have a corresponding ripple effect through the policy environment at the 
state and local levels.  While the first recommendation in this section addressed the ICT 
challenges of the network, a comprehensive KM system designed to achieve knowledge 
interoperability at all levels should be implemented.  The simple aspect of this issue 
certainly is to recommend a course of action—it is much more difficult to design and 
implement than to offer a recommendation.  However for major disasters, Katrina and 
9/11 should have identified virtually all the components of disaster related knowledge 
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that a theoretical KM system would require.  The challenge is to maintain the momentum 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, tragedies are the catalysts that force us to change our systems and 
ways of thinking.  The attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have left an indelible mark 
on our national response system, and each tragedy highlighted many areas and issues that 
require significant improvement.  Although much of the Katrina examination has been 
focused on New Orleans, lessons have been learned by communities throughout the Gulf 
Coast region.  The real question is do we have the wisdom and determination to change?  
In my view, Katrina presents an opportunity to put forward a different thesis to a 
problem that we have faced in the past and we will certainly be called to face again.  
While several national policies have articulated that America should create a broad, 
national approach to disaster response, our culture inhibits us from doing so.  Leveraging 
the network of first responders, regardless of affiliation, is an element of that vision.  
Designing and implementing a Knowledge Management System that supports the full 
integration of the broader network will not only improve the use of resources, but also 
improve operational performance and decision-making.  Changing and improving our 
doctrine to include both elements of this strategy is required at the federal level—a 
change that will ultimately drive additional cultural changes in state and local 
governments. 
While reflecting on our national response to Katrina, I was struck by a quote from 
David Halberstam’s book The Amateurs about the 1985 U.S. Olympic rowing team.  
“When most oarsmen talked about their perfect moments in a boat, they referred not so 
much to winning a race but to the feel of the boat, all eight oars in the water together, the 
synchronization almost perfect.  In moments like that, the boat seemed to lift right out of 
the water. Oarsmen called that the moment of swing.”148  The entire nation, pulling 
together, in perfect synchronization—now that’s unity of effort. 
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